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INFORMATION  ON  THE  COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Complete  list of publications giving information on the  Court: 
I  - Information on  current  cases  (for general use) 
1.  Hearings  of the Court 
The  calendar of public hearings  is drawn  up each week.  It  is sometimes 
necessary to alter it subsequently;  it is therefore  only a  guide. 
This  calendar  may  be  obtained free  of charge  on  request  from the 
Court  Registry.  In French. 
2.  Judgments  and  opinions  of Advocates-General 
Photocopies  of these  documents  are  sent to the parties and  may  be 
obtained on  request  by other interested persons,  after they have 
been read and distributed at  the  public hearing.  Free  of  charge. 
Requests for  judgments  should be  made  to the Registry.  Opinions  of 
the  Advocates-General  may  be  obtained from the  Press  and  Information 
Branch.  As  from  1972  the  London ~  carries articles under the 
heading  "European  law  Reports" covering the  more  important  cases  in 
which the  Court  has  given  judgment. 
II - Technical  information and documentation 
A - Publications of the  Court  of Justice  of the European Communities 
1.  Reports  of Cases before  the  Court 
The  Reports  of Cases  before  the  Court  are the only authentic 
source  for citations of  judgments  of the  Court  of Justice. 
The  volumes  for the years  1954  to  1972  are  publishen  ir. 
Dutch,  French,  German  and  Italian;  the volumes for  1973  onwards 
are also  published in English and  in Danish.  An  English edition of 
the volumes  for  1954-72  will be  completed by the  end  of 1978. 
The  Danish edition of the volumes for 1954-72  will be  available  by 
the  end of 1977. -2-
2.  Legal  publications  on  European  integration  (Bibliography) 
New  edition in  1966  and  supplements. 
3.  Bibliography of European  case-law 
Concerning  judicial decisions relating to the Treaties establishing 
the  European  Communities.  1965  edition with  supplements. 
4.  Selected  instruments  on  the  organization,  jurisdiction and 
procedures  of the  Court 
1975  edition. 
These  publications are  on  sale at,  and  may  be  ordered from: 
,f>  ..1' 
l'  OFFICE  DES  PUBLICATIONS  DES  COlVJlVJDNAUTES  EUROPEENNES, 
Rue  du  Commerce,  Case  Postale  1003,  Luxembourg. 
and  from the  following addresses: 
Belgium: 
Denmark: 
France: 
Germany: 
Ireland: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
United  Kingdom: 
Ets.  Emile  Bruylant,  Rue  de  la  R~gence 67, 
1000  BRUSSELS 
J.  H.  Schultz'  Boghandel,  M¢ndergade  19, 
1116  COPENHAGEN  K 
Editions  A.  Pedone,  13,  Rue  Soufflot, 
75005  PARIS 
Carl  Heymann's  Verlag,  Gereonstrasse  18-32, 
5000  KOLN  l 
Messrs.  Greene  & Co.,  Booksellers,  16,  Clare  Street, 
DUBLIN  2 
Casa Editrice Dott.  A.  Milani,  Via Jappelli 5, 
35100  PADUA  M.  64194 
Office  des  publications officielles des  Communautes 
europeennes, 
Case  Postale  1003, 
LUXEMBOURG 
NV  Martinus Nijhoff,  Lange  Voorhout  9, 
Is  GRA VENHAGE 
Sweet  & Maxwell,  Spon  (Booksellers)  Limited, 
North  Way, 
ANDOVER,  RANTS,  SPlO  5BE Other  Countries: 
-3-
Office  des  publications officielles des  Communautes 
europeennes, 
Case  Postale  1003, 
LUXEMBOURG  ------
B - Publications  issued by the  Press and  Legal  Information service of 
the  Court  of Justice 
1.  Proceedings of the Court  of Justice  of the  European  Communities 
Weekly  summary  of the  proceedings  of the  Court  published in the  six 
official languages of the  Community.  Free  of  charge.  Available 
from the  Press  and  Information  Branch;  please  indicate  language 
required. 
2.  Information  on the  Court  of Justice 
Quarterly bulletin containing the heading and a  short  summary  of 
the  more  important  cases  brought  before the  Court  of Justice  and 
before national courts. 
3.  Annual  synopsis  of the work  of the  Court  of Justice 
Annual  booklet  containing a  summary  of the  work  of the  Court  of 
Justice  covering both cases  decided and associated work  (seminars 
for  judges,  visits,  study groups,  etc.). 
4.  General booklet  of  information on tne  Court  of Justice 
These  four  documents  are  published in the  six official languages  of 
the  Community  while the  general booklet  is also  published in  Spanish 
and  Gaelic.  They  may  be  ordered from the  information offices of the 
European Communities at the addresses  given  a0ove.  They  may  also be 
obtained from the  Information  Service  of the Court  of Justice,  B. P. 
1406,  Luxembourg. - 4  -
C - Compendium  of case-law relating to the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities 
Repertoire  de  la .jurisprudence  relative aux traites instituant  les 
Communautes  europeennes 
Europaische  Rechtsprechung 
Extracts from cases relating to the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities  published in  German  and French.  Extracts from national 
judgments  are  also  published in the original  language. 
The  German  and French editions are  available  from: 
Carl  Heymann's  Verlag, 
Gereonstrasse  18-32, 
ll 
D 5000  KOLN  1, 
Federal Republic  of  Germany. 
As  from  1973  an English edition has  been  added to the  complete  French 
and  German  editions.  The  first  two  volumes  of the English series are  on 
sale  from: 
III-Visits 
ELSEVIER  - North Holland  -
Excerpta Medica, 
P.O.  Box  211, 
AMSTERDAM, 
Netherlands. 
Sessions  of the  Court  are  held  on  Tuesdays,  Wednesdays  and Thursdays  every 
week,  except  during the Court's vacations- that  is,  from  20  December to  6 
January,  the  week  preceding and the  week  following Easter,  and from  15  July 
to  15  September.  Please  consult the full list of  public holidays  in 
Luxembourg  set  out  below. 
Visitors  may  attend public  hearings  of the  Court  or of the  Chambers  to the 
extent  permitted by the  seating capacity.  No  visitor may  be  present  at  cases 
heard  in camera or during  proceedings for  the  adoption of  interim measures. 
Half  an  hour  before the  beginning of  public hearings  a  summary  of the  case  or 
cases to be  dealt  with is available to visitors who  have  indicated their 
intention of attending the  hearing. 
*  *  * - 5 -
Public holidays  in  Luxembourg 
In addition to the Court's vacations  mentioned  above  the  Court  of Justice 
is closed on the  following days: 
New  Year's  Day 
Carnival Monday 
Easter Monday 
Ascension Day 
Whit  Monday 
May  Day 
Luxembourg National  Holiday 
Assumption 
"Schobermesse"  Monday 
All  Hallows'  Day 
All  Souls'  Day 
Christmas  Eve 
Christmas  Day 
Boxing Day 
New  Year's Eve 
*  * 
1  January 
variable 
variable 
variable 
variable 
1  May 
23  June 
15  August 
Last  Monday  of August  or 
first  Monday  of  September 
1  November 
2  November 
24  December 
25  December 
26  December 
31  December 
* 
IV - Summary  of types  of  procedure  before  the  Court  of Justice 
It will  be  remembered that under the  Treaties a  case  may  be  brought  before 
the  Court  of Justice either by  a  national court  or tribunal with a  view to 
determining the validity or  interpretation of a  provision of Community  law, 
or directly by the  Community  institutions,  Member  States or  private  parties 
under  the  conditions  laid down  by  the Treaties. 
A - References for  preliminary rulings 
The  national court  or tribunal submits to the  Court  of Justice questions 
relating to the validity or interpretation of a  provision of Community 
law by  means  of a  formal  judicial document  (decision,  judgment - 6  -
or order)  containing the  wording of the question(s)  which it wishes to 
refer to the  Court  of Justice.  This  document  is sent  by the  Registry 
of the national court to the Registry of the Court  of Justice, 
accompanied  in appropriate  cases  by a  file  intended to  inform the 
Court  of Justice  of the  background and  scope  of the questions  referred. 
During a  period  of  two  months  the  Commission,  the  Member  States and the 
parties to the national  proceedings  may  submit  observations  or statements 
of  case to the Court  of Justice,  after which they will  be  summoned  to  a 
hearing at  which they  may  submit  oral observations,  through their Agents 
in the  case  of the  Commission  and the  Member  States or through  lawyers 
who  are  entitled to practise  before  a  court  of a  Member  State. 
After the  Advocate-General  has  delivered his  opinion,  the  judgment  given 
by the  Court  of Justice is transmitted to the national court through the 
Registries. 
B - Direct  actions 
Actions  are  brought  before the  Court  by an application addressed by a 
lawyer to the  Registrar  (B.P.  1406,  Luxembourg),  by registered post. 
Any  lawyer  who  is entitled to practise  before  a  court  of a  Member  State 
or  a  professor  occupying a  chair of  law  in a  university of  a  Member 
State,  where  the  law of such  State authorizes him to  plead before  its 
own  courts,  is qualified to  appear  before  the  Court  of Justice. 
The  application must  contain: 
the  name  and  permanent  residence  of the  applicant; 
the name  of the  party against  whom  the application is made; 
the  subject-matter of the  dispute  and the  grounds  on  which the 
application is based; 
the  form of order  sought  by the applicant; 
the nature  of any  evidence  offered; 
an address  for  service  in the  place  where  the Court  of Justice  has 
its seat,  with an  indication of the name  of a  person  who  is 
authorized and has  expressed willingness to accept  service. - 7 -
The  application  should also  be  accompanied  by the following documents: 
the decision the  annulment  of  which is sought,  or,  in the  case of 
proceedings against  an  implied decision,  by  documentary evidence  of 
the  date  on  which the  request to the  institution in question was 
lodged; 
a  certificate that the  lawyer is entitled to  practise before  a  court 
of a  Member  State; 
where  an applicant  is a  legal  person  governed  by  private  law,  the 
instrument  or instruments  constituting and regulating it, and  proof 
that the authority granted to the applicant's  lawyer  has  been 
properly conferred on  him by  someone  authorized for the  purpose. 
The  parties must  choose  an  address for  service  in  Luxembourg.  In the 
case  of the  Governments  of  Member  States,  the address for  service  is 
normally that  of their diplomatic representative accredited to the 
Government  of the  Grand  Duchy.  In the  case  of private  parties  (natural 
or legal persons)  the address for  service  - which  in fact  is merely a 
"letter box"  - may  be that  of a  Luxembourg  lawyer  or  any  person enjoying 
their confidence. 
The  application is notified to defendants  by the  Registry of the 
Court  of Justice.  It calls for  a  statement  of defence to  be  put  in by 
them;  these  documents  may  be  supplemented by a  reply on the  part  of the 
applicant  and finally a  rejoinder  on  the  part  of  the  defence. 
The  written  procedure thus  completed is followed  by an oral hearing, 
at  which the  parties are  represented by  lawyers  or agents  (in the  case  of 
Community  institutions or Member  States) 
After the  opinion of the  Advocate  General  has  been delivered,  judgment 
is given.  It  is served  on the  parties by the  Registry. 
*  *  * - 8  -
COMPOSITION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
for the  judicial year  1977  to  1978 
First Chamber 
President:  G.  BOSCO 
Judges:  A.  M.  DONNER 
(order of precedence) 
H.  KUTSCHER,  President 
M.  S¢'RENSEN,  President  of  Second Chamber 
G.  REISCHL,  First  Advocate  C:eneral 
G.  BOSCO,  President  of First  Chamber 
A.  M.  DONNER,  Judge 
J.  MERTENS  DE  WILMARS,  Judge 
P.  PESCATORE,  Judge 
E.  MAYRAS,  Advocate  General 
J.-P.  WARNER,  Advocate  General 
LORD  MACKENZIE  STUART,  Judge 
A.  O'KEEFFE,  Judge 
F.  CAPOTORTI,  Advocate  General 
A.  TOUFFAIT,  Judge 
A.  VAN  HOUTTE,  Registrar 
COMPOSITION  OF  CHAMBERS 
Second  Chamber 
President:  M.  S¢'RENSEN 
Judges:  P.  PESCATORE 
J.  MERTENS  DE  WILMARS  LORD  MACKENZIE  STUART 
Advocates 
General: 
A.  O'KEEFFE 
H.  MAYRAS 
J.-P.  WARNER 
A.  TOUFFAIT 
Advocates  G.  REISCHL 
General:  F.  CAPOTORTI - 9 -
JUDGMENTS 
of the 
COURT  OF  JUSTICE 
of the 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES - 10  -
ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  THE  CASE-LAW  OF  THE  COURT  OF  JUSTICE 
AGRICULTURE 
Case  2/77  -Hoffmann's Starkefabriken A.G.  v  Hauptzollamt  Bielefeld 
Case  125/76  - Peter Cremer  v  Bundesanstalt  fur  landwirtschaftliche 
warktordnung 
BRUSSELS  CONVENTION 
Cases  9 and - Bavaria Fluggesellschaft and  Germanair 
10/77 
COlYJMON  CUSTOMS  TARIFF 
Case  1/77  - Robert  Bosch  GmbH  v  Hauptzollamt  Hildesheim 
FREE  CIRCULATION  OF  GOODS 
Case  89/76  - Commission v  Netherlands 
Case  5/77  - Tedeschi v  Denka  vi  t 
FREE  MOVE:MENT  OF  PERSONS 
Case  8/77  - Sagulo  and Others 
HARMONIZATION  OF  LAWS 
Case  123/76  -Commission of the European Communities v  Italian Republic - 11  -
SOCIAL  SECURITY  FOR  MIGRANT  WORKERS 
Case  112/76 - R.  Manzoni  v  Fonds  National  de  Retraite des  Ouvriers Mineurs 
Case  22/77  - Fonds  National  de  Retraite des  Ouvriers Mineurs v  G.  Mura 
Case  37/77 -F. Greco  v  Fonds  National  de  Retraite des  Ouvriers Mineurs - 12  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
12  July 1977 
Commission v  Netherlands 
Case  89/76 
Free movement  of  goods  - Customs  duties  on exportation - Charges 
having equivalent  effect - Concept  - Phytosanitary  inspections  -
International Plant Protection Convention - Free  importation into 
the country of destination -Multinational system of  inspections -
Absence  of obstacles to trade - Fees  - Actual  cost  of inspections -
Admissibility - Procedure  for  financing  inspections - Standardization 
Powers  of the  Community  institutions 
(EEC  Treaty,  Arts.  12,  16  and  36) 
(1)  Phytosanitary inspections  on  exportation,  provided for  by  an 
International Convention  intended to  encourage  the  free  import  of 
plants  into the countries of destination by  establishing a  system 
of  inspections  in the  exporting State,  recognized  and  organized 
on  a  reciprocal basis,  do  not  constitute unilateral measures 
hindering trade but  help  to  overcome  the  obstacles  which  the 
inspections of imports  envisaged by Article 36  of the Treaty mqr 
place  in the  w~ of the free movement  of  goods. 
(2)  The  fees  charged for  such  inspections are not  charges having an 
effect  equivalent  to  customs duties  provided that their amount 
does  not  exceed the  actual  cost  of the operations  in respect  of 
which they  are  charged. 
(3)  The  institutions are  free  to  adopt  in the future  any measures 
which may  be necessary for the  standardization of the procedure 
for the financing of  such  inspections. 
N  o  t  e 
The  Commission  lodged an application for  a  declaration ~hat by 
imposing pecuniary charges  on exports to  other  Mem~er States ln respect 
of a  phytosanitary examination of plants and  ~er~aln pl~nt  ~roducts, the 
Kingdom  of the  Netherlands  had  failed to fulfll lts  ?b~l~atlons under 
the  Treaty and  had  in particular,  violated the prohlbltlon on the 
introduction of  ch~rges having an effect  equivalent  to customs  duties 
cont~ined in Articles 9,  12  and  16  of the Treaty. - 13  -
The  Kingdom  of the  Netherlands  in fact  imposes  a  pecuniary charge 
in respect  of phytosanitary examinations carried out  in respect  of exports 
of plants and certain plant  products to  other Member  states and to third 
countries. 
The  Commission maintained that those  charges,  which are  imposed  on 
exported products by reason of the  fact  that  they cross the  frontier and 
never  on products marketed within the  country,  constitute a  charge  having 
an effect  equivalent  to a  customs  duty on exports. 
In its defence the  Netherlands  Government  maintained that the 
pecuniary charges in dispute are  intended to  cover the  costs  of examinations 
carried out  when  phytosanitary certificates provided for under the  International 
Plant  Protection Convention,  signed at  Rome  on 6  December  1951,  are  issued. 
Far  from  forming an obstacle to trade,  the  issue  of  such certificates 
facilitates intra-Community trade by providing the  exporter with the 
assurance that  he  will not  meet  with any  obstacles to  importation in the 
country of destination.  Since the  examinations are made  and  the 
corresponding certificates issued at  the  request  of the  exporter there is 
no  legal obligation to pay the  charges in question,  with the  result that 
in this instance the  criterion of unilateral and compulsory imposition 
required by the case-law of the  Court  is not  satisfied. 
The  Commission maintained that  as phytosanitary certificates are 
indispensable in international trade,  the  exporter is under a  de  facto 
obligation imposed by the requirements  of the  importing country and is 
therefore unable  to  escape  payment  of the  charge  required by the Netherlands. 
The  Court  has  found that  the certificates in respect  of which the 
pecuniary  ch~rge in question is imposed are in accordance  with the  Inter-
national Plant  Protection Convention of 6  December  1951 7  to which all the 
Member  states are party.  In international trade the  issue  of  such certifi-
cates is intended to encourage the  importation of plants into the  country 
of destination without  restriction on the basis  of the  examination carried 
out  in the  country of origin of the  products  in question.  Thus, 
within the  area which it covers,  that  Convention performs  a 
function similar to that  of the provisions governing plant  hygiene  and 
phytosanitory controls adopted within the  Community. 
It therefore appears that  in this instance the measures  in question 
were  not  imposed unilaterally by the Kingdom  of the  Netherlands  out  of 
purely national interest but  rather constitute an examination  organized 
on the  same  basis by all the  Member  States as parties to the  Convention 
of 6  December  1951. - 14  -
In those  circumstances the pecuniary charges  imposed  when  such 
examinations are carried out  cannot  be  regarded as  charges  having an effect 
equivalent  to  customs  duties,  provided that their amount  does  not  exceed 
the  real cost  of the  operations as  a  result  of which they are  imposed. 
The  Court  has  dismissed the  application lodged by the  Commission  against 
the  Netherlands  but  in doing so  emphasized that the  present  judgment 
cannot  limit  the  freedom  of the  Community  institutions to adopt  in future 
any provisions  which may  be  necessary to harmonize the  rules applicable 
to the  financing of the  examinations  in question and that  for the  purposes 
of that  harmonization the  present  judgment  cannot  be  regarded as providing 
the  Netherlands with an established right to maintain its present  system. - 15  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
12  July 1977 
Hoffmann's  Starkefabriken A.G.  v  Hauptzollamt  Bielefeld 
Case  2/77 
1.  Agriculture- Common  organization of the markets- Cereals-
Maize  starch - Production refund - Calculation - Supply price 
of basic product - Modification - General  power of Council  -
Free  exercise 
(Regulation No.  371/67  of the Council,  Art.  2;  Regulation No. 
1132/74  of the  Council,  Art.  ·r;  Regulation No.  120/67  of the 
Council,  Arts.  11  (3),  26) 
2.  Agriculture- Common  organization of the markets- Agricultural 
prices (principle of annual  fixing)  - Adjustments 
3.  Agriculture- Common  organization of the markets- Maize-starch 
and potato-starch - Production refund - Calculation - Supply 
price of basic products - Justification 
(Regulation No.  321/75  of the  Council,  Art.  1) 
1.  It cannot be  conceded  tha~when the  Council  adopted the  specific 
provision in Article  2  of Regulation No.  371/67  and Article 1  of 
Regulation No.  1132/74,  it intended to restrict the  exercise of 
a  general  power which it had expressly conferred on itself by 
Articl€Sll  (3)  and  26  of Regulation No.  120/67  and  which it 
required to  exercise freely for the proper administration of 
the  relevant  organization of the market. 
2.  Whilst  the  annual  fixing of agricultural prices indeed constitutes 
a  basic economic  feature of the  common  agricultural policy as it 
is at present  implemented  such fixing neither implies that those 
prices cannot  be  changed in any  circumstances nor,  in consequence, 
does it prohibit the  Council  from  adjusting them in the  course of 
the marketing year,  when  such  adjustments are  justified. 
3.  There  are objective grounds  for the difference between the 
treatment  accorded potato-starch producers and that  accorded maize-
starch producers in the matter of the  calculation of the production 
refund following  a  change  in the  supply price of the basic product 
so  that the transitional measure  enacted by Article 1  of Regulation 
No.  231/75  in connexion with the production refund for potato-starch 
does  not  constitute discrimination against maize-starch producers. - 16  -
N o  t  e 
The  Finanzgericht  Mffnster  referred two  questions to the  Court  for a 
preliminary ruling.  The  first  concerned the validity of Article  1  (1) 
of Regulation  (EEC)  No.  3113/74  of the  Council  of 9  December  1974  on 
production refunds  in the  cereals and  rice sectors. 
The  second question,  which was  asked in the  alternative,  concerned 
the interpretation of the  second  subparagraph of Article 40  (3)  of the 
EEC  Treaty in connexion with the methods  of calculating the  production 
refunds  on potato and maize  starch. 
Those  questions  were  referred within the  context  of a  dispute  between 
HoffmannVs  St~rkefabriken AG  and the  Hauptzollamt  Bielefeld over the  amount 
payable to the  applicant  by way  of a  production refund  on maize  intended 
for the manufacture  of starch. 
The  first  question,  which  concerns the  validity of Article  1  (1) 
of Regulation  (EEC)  No.  3113/74  of the  Council,  asks  whether the provision 
in question is invalid or,  at  the  least,  inapplicable  on three grounds. 
1.  According to the  first  of those  grounds,  the  requirements  of an 
appreciable  and persistent  variation in the  price of maize  on the  world 
market,  that  is,  in particular,  a  rise in price in relation to the  supply 
price,  were  not  satisfied in December  1974  when  the  Council  fixed the 
supply price at  103.10  units  of account  per metric ton. 
The  Court  has  stated that  it  emerges  from  an analysis  of basic 
Regulation No.  120/67  that  the  supply price  (the  level of which,  unlike 
the threshold price,  determines the  amount  of the refund)  must  be  fixed 
having regard to all the factors  which determine the  competitive position 
of the manufacture  of  starch from  maize  in relation,  first,  to  synthetic 
substitutes and,  secondly,  to potato starch. 
It  cannot  be  accepted that  when  it adopted the  special rule providing 
for the  specific alteration of the  supply price  referred to in Article 7 
of  Regulation No.  1132/74  the  Council  intended to restrict the  exercise 
of  a  general power  which it had  expressly assumed.  When  it  found that 
prices  were  remaining at  a  very high level and that,  as  compared with the 
period before  1 January 1973,  there was  an appreciable  and persistent 
variation in world prices,  the  Council  was  not  exceeding its discretionary 
power in that matter. - 17  -
The  maintenance  of world prices at  such high  levels  could  not  fail 
to affect  the fixing of the  supply price  since,  in so  far as the  refund 
was  intended to compensate  for  the  handicap  suffered by manufacturers  of 
starch from  maize  as  a  result  of their inability to  obtain raw materials 
at  prices close to those  on the  world market,  that  high  level of prices 
removed all justification for the  refund.  At  no  time  was  it alleged that 
the  reduction in the  refund affected,  in a  manner  unfavourable to producers 
of maize  starch,  the  competitive  situation existing between them  and 
producers  of synthetic  starch or manufacturers  of potato  starch. 
2.  The  second  ground  suggests that  when it adopted the regulation in 
dispute the  Council violated Article  11  of basic Regulation No.  120/67  by 
reducing,  with  a  view to its gradual abolition,  a  refund to  which manufacturers 
of maize  starch were  entitled.  The  Court  observed that  although the  text 
of Article  11  of Regulation No.  120/67  does  not  appear to make  the grant 
of the  refund optional it does,  however,  give  the  Council  power to fix 
the  amount  in question in the  light  of the  objectives of general  interest 
listed in Article  39  of the  Treaty. 
3.  The  third and final  ground put  forward  by the plaintiff in the main 
action raises the  question whether the regulation in dispute  is invalid in 
that  it violates the  principle that  agricultural prices  shall remain 
u..11.changed  during a  single marketing year. 
The  Court  has  replied that  even though the  annual  fixing of 
agricultural prices is indeed a  basic  economic  element  of the  common 
agricultural policy it cannot  imply either that,  whatever  happens,  those 
prices will remain unchanged  or,  as  a  result,  that  the  Council  is 
prohibited from  making  justified adjustments  during a  marketing year. 
A  secondary guestion from  the  national  court  asked the  Court  of 
Justice to interpret the  second  subparagraph of Article 40  (3)  of the 
EEC  Treaty  (prohibition on discrimination between producers  or 
consumers  within the  Co~nmunity)  and Regulation No.  1132/74  (requirement 
that the production refunds  on potato  and  maize  starch shall be  equal) 
in conjunction with Article  1  (1)  of Regulation No.  3113/74  concerning 
the calculation of the  production refund for  maize  starch. 
The  Court  has ruled that the  difference  between the  treatment  of 
producers  of potato  starch and that  of producers  of maize  starch is 
objectively justified and that  therefore the transitional measure  adopted 
in relation to the production refund  on potato  starch does  not  constitute 
discrimination with regard to producers  of maize  starch. - 18  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROFEAN  COMMUNITIES 
14  July 1977 
Sagulo  and  Others 
Case  8/77 
1.  Freedom  of movement  for persons -Nationals of Member  States 
Right  of entry and residence - Right  directly conferred by 
Community  law - Acknowledgement  - Special residence document 
Issue - Declaratory effect - Not  to be  assimilated to general 
residence permit  for  aliens -No discretion on the part of 
national authorities 
(EEC  Treaty,  Art.  48;  Directive No.  68/360,  Art.  4) 
2.  Freedom  of movement  for persons - Nationals of Member  States -
Document  prescribed by Directive No.  68/360  - General  residence 
permit -Requirement  by  a  Member  State - Penalties -Not 
permissible 
(Directive No.  68/360,  Art.  4(2)  and  Annex) 
3.  Freedom  of movement  for persons - Nationals  of Member  States -
General  residence permit -National provisions -Non-conformity 
with Community  law - Infringement  - Directive No.  68/360  -
National  implementing measures  - Infringement  - Increase in 
penalties -Not permissible 
4.  Freedom  of movement  for  persons - Nationals of Member  States 
Documents  of identity referred to  in Directive No.  68/360 
Penalties -Nature of  offence committed- Proportionality 
(EEC  Treaty,  Art.  7;  Directive No.  68/360) 
1.  The  right  of nationals of Member  States to  enter the  territory of 
another Member  State and to reside there for the purposes mentioned 
in the Treaty follows  directly from  the Treaty or frorr.  the provisions 
adopted for its implementation. 
The  issue of the special residence  document  provided for  in Article 
4  of Council  Directive No.  68/360  of 15  October 1968  on the 
abolition of restrictions  on  movement  and residence within the 
Community  for workers  of Member  States  and their families  has  only 
a  declaratory effect;  for aliens to whom  Article 48  of the Treaty 
or parallel provisions  give rights,  it cannot  be assimilated to 
a  residence  permit  such  as  is prescribed for  aliens  in general,  in 
connexion with the issue of which the national authorities have  a 
discretion. - 19  -
2.  A Member  State mczy  not  require from  a  person  enjoying the 
protection of Community  law that he  should possess  a  general 
residence permit  instead of  the document  provided for  in Article 
4(2)  of Directive No.  68/360  in conjunction with the Annex  thereto 
f  the  failure to possess  such a  permit.  nor  m~ it impose penalties  or 
3.  The  force  of res, judi~  arising from  a  prior conviction 
arrived at  on the basis of national provisions not  in 
accordance with the requirements  of Community  law  cannot 
justify an increase in the penalties to be  imposed for  an 
infringement  of the provisions which  a  Member  State has 
adopted to  secure the application of Directive No.  68/360 
in its territory. 
4.  It is for the  competent  authorities of each Member  State 
to  impose penalties where  appropriate  on  a  person subject 
to the provisions of Community  law who  has failed to provide 
himself with one  of the documents  of identity referred to  in 
Article 3(1)  of Directive  No.  68/360  but  the penalties  imposed 
must  not  be disproportionate to the nature of the offence 
committed. 
N  o  t  e 
In this case two  Italian nationals and  a  French national were 
the  subject  of criminal proceedings brought  under the  German  Ausl~ndergesetz 
(Aliens  Law)  of 28  April 1965. 
Those  proceedings resulted in a  court  order imposing a  fine  on 
the two  Italian nationals for  having resided in the  Federal Republic 
of  Germany  without  a  valid passport  or identity card,  that  is, therefore, 
without  any valid residence permit. 
Although the  French national was  in possession of a  valid passport 
he  had refused to comply with the formalities  required by the  German 
authorities in order to  obtain a  residence permit  and  was  detained for 
a  short  time  in order for criminal proceedings to be brought  against  him; 
he  was  accused of having failed to take the  necessary steps to regularize 
his position. 
The  above  facts  led the Amtsgericht  Reutlingen to ask the  Court  of 
Justice to give a  preliminary ruling on the  interpretation of Articles 7 
and 48  of the  EEC  Treaty  (concerning the  prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds  of nationality and freedom  of movement  for  workers)  and  of 
Article 4  of Council Directive No.  68/360  on the abolition of restrictions 
on movement  and residence within the  Community  for  workers  of Member 
states and their families. - 20  -
The  questions  referred ask,  basically,  whether  the  Member  States are 
still entitled to  apply to persons  enjoying  the  protection of  Community 
law general  legislative provisions relating to the  entry and  residence  of 
aliens and,  where  appropriate,  the penalties attaching to an  infringement 
of those provisions. 
lt is undeniable that  the  right  of nationals  of a  Member  State to 
enter the  territory of another Member  state and to stay there  derives 
directly from the  Treaty or from  the  provisions  adopted for its 
implementation. 
Nevertheless,  Community  law  has  not  deprived Member  States  of the 
power to  adopt  measures  designed to  enable the  national authorities to 
obtain precise  information concerning movements  of population within their 
territory. 
It is in order to  enable  States to  obtain such information that 
Directive  No.  68/360  provided for two  formalities,  that  is,  possession of 
a  valid identity card  or national passport  and proof of the  right  of 
residence through the  issue  of a  document  known  as  a  "Residence  Fermi  t  for 
a  National  of a  Member  State  of the  EEC".  Since the  Member  States are 
entitled to  choose  the  manner  in which they will give  effect to the 
provisions  of the directive within their territory it is for them to 
introduce  criminal  sanctions  or to apply those  which  are provided for in 
their general  legislation. 
However,  a  Member  State is not  entitled to  adopt  administrative 
or  legal measures  which would  have  the  effect  of restricting the  full 
exercise  of rights  conferred by  Community  law  on the nationals  of the 
other Member  States. 
Community  law cannot  preclude the  application of appropriate 
measures  of constraint  in the  case  of infringement  of national provisions 
adopted in accordance  with Directive  No.  68/360;  similarly,  the 
repeated disregard of provisions  adopted  by a  Member  State in implementation 
of  that directive  may,  where  appropriate,  justify an  increase  in the 
severity of the  penalties applicable.  However,  the  fact  that  an earlier 
conviction has  become  res  judicata cannot  in itself constitute grounds 
for  a  heavier penalty  on a  subsequent  conviction. 
In reply to those  questions the  Court  has  ruled that: 
(1)  The  issue  of the  special residence  document  provided for  in Article 
4  of  Counc~l Directive No.  68/360  of  15  October  1968  on the  abolition of 
restrictions  on movement  and residence within the  Community  for workers  of 
Member  States and their faffiilies  is only declaratory in effect  and,  as 
regards aliens  who  derive rights  under Article 48  of the  EEC  Treaty or  under 
comparable  provisions,  cannot  be  regarded as  a  residence permit  involving 
discretionary power  on the  part  of the  national authorities,  such as  is 
provided for  in respect  of aliens in general. 
(2)  A Member  State may  not  require  from  a  person enjoying the protection 
of  Community  law possession of a  residence permit  in place of the  document 
provided for in the  combined provisions  of Article 4  (2)  and the  Annex to 
Directive  No.  68/3607  nor  may  it impose  penalties in cases  where  no  such 
permit  has  been issued. - 21  -
(3)  The  fact  that  an earlier conviction,  obtained  on the basis of national 
provisions which are not  in accordance  with the  requirements  of Community 
law,  has  become  res  judicata cannot  justify an increase in the  severity 
of penalties applicable in the  case  of infringement  of the  provisions 
adopted by a  Member  State  in order to  secure the  application within its 
territory of Directive No.  68/360. 
A further question referred asked whether the  fact  that  a  person 
entitled by  Community  law to reside in the territory of a  Member  State 
failed to  obtain valid identity papers as  expressly required by the 
directive does  not  create discrimination,  as  regards the  sanctions applied, 
between a  person subject to  Community  law,  who  is liable to relatively 
heavy penalties,  anJ  a  national of the  Member  State in question who  is 
subject  to considerably lighter ones. 
The  Court  has ruled that it is for the  competent  authorities  of  each 
Member  State to apply where  appropriate  criminal sanctions to a  failure by 
a  person governed by the provisions  of Community  law to  obtain one  of the 
types  of proof of identity referred to in Article 3  (1)  of Directive 
No.  68/360,  but  that the  sanctions applied in such a  case mustnot be  out 
of proportion to the  nature  of the  offence  committed. - 22  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
14  July 1977 
Commission  of the  European  Communities  v  Italian Republic 
Case  123/76 
Harmonization of laws relating to electrical equipment  - Council  Directive 
No.  73/23  (EEC)  - Mandatory application 
In setting a  precise period for  the  putting into  force  of national provisions, 
Article  13  of Directive No.  73/23  (EEC)  requires the  adoption of provisions 
ensuring that Articles  5 to 8  of the  directive shall apply fully and 
immediately in cases to which they relate.  For  the purposes  of the  directive 
and  of Article  13  thereof, it does  not  suffice for Member  States to postpone 
the  implementation of that article until the  time  when  the  standards  concerned 
have  been adopted. 
N  o  t  e 
The  Commission applied to the  Court  for  a  declaration that  "by 
failing to put  into force,  within the  required time-limit,  the  provisions 
necessary in order to  conform with Council Directive  No.  73/23/EEC  of 
19  February 1973,  on the  harmonization of the  laws  of Member  States 
relating to electrical equipment  designed for  use  within certain voltage 
limits,  the  Italian Republic  has  failed to fulfil an obljgation under 
the  Treaty". 
Article  13  of that  directive provides that  "The  Member  States shall 
put  into force  the  laws,  regulations  and administrative provisions 
necessary to  comply with the requirements  of this Directive within 
eighteen months  of its notification and  shall forthwith  inform the 
Commission thereof". 
In its defence,  the  Italian Gover~~ent maintained that  as  a  result 
of the  premature dissolution of the  legislature it had  been impossible 
for the  Chamber  of Deputies to approve  the draft  law  submitted for the 
implementation of the directive.  It  added that  although the  adoption 
of new  legislation was  necessary in order to  ensure the  implementation of 
the  directive as  a  whole  its essential provisions  were  already applied 
in the  Italian legal  system through the existing legislation and  rules. 
As  the time-limit  for  introducing the  legislation had passed,  the 
question arose  as to whether the  ItalLan Republic  had failed to fulfil 
an obligation arising under Article  13  of the  directive. - 23  -
The  defence  submitted that  as  long as  no  harmonized  or  international 
rules  have  been adopted the  Member  states are  not  bound to put  into force 
the  laws,  regulations and administrative provisions necessary to  comply 
therewith and to ensure the  application thereof within their territory. 
In the  opinion of  the  Court  the  foregoing argument  disregards the 
fact  that  by fixing a  specific period  (18  months)  within which the  national 
provisions must  be  put  into force,  Article  13  requires the  establishment 
of a  framework  ensuring that  Articles 5 to 8  of the directive take  full 
and  immediate  effect  in the  cases provided for in those provisions. 
The  Court  has  held that  by failing to put  into force  within the 
required period the provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 
No.  73/23/EEC  of  19  February  1973 the  Italian Republic  failed to fulfil 
ah obligation arising under the  Treaty. - 24  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNPriES 
14  July 1977 
Bavaria Fluggesellschaft  Schwabe  & Co.  and  Germanair 
Bedarfsluftfahrt  GmbH  & Co.  v  Eurocontrol,  Brussels 
Joined Cases  9 and  10/77 
1.  Convention  of  27  September  1968  - Concepts  and  legal 
classifications laid down  by  the  Court  - Uniform  application 
in the Member  States 
2.  Convention  of  27  September 1968  - Judgments  excluded  from 
the  scope  of the latter - Bilateral agreements  - Application 
Exclusive  jurisdiction of national  court 
(Convention of  27  September  1968 7  Art.  55,  first  paragraph 
of Art.  56,  Protocol  on  the Interpretation by  the Court  of 
Justice of the Convention of  27  September 1968,  Art.  1) 
1.  The  principle of legal certainty in the  Community  legal 
system and  the  objectives  of the Brussels  Convention  in 
accordance with Article  220  of the EEC  Treaty,  which is 
at  its origin,  require  in all Member  States  2  uniform 
application of the  legal  concepts  and  legal  classifications 
developed by the Court  in the  context  of the 
Brussels  Convention. 
2.  A national court  must  not  apply the Brussels  Convention 
so  as  to recognize  or  enforce  judgments which  are  excluded 
from  its scope  as  determined  by  the  Court  of Justice.  On 
the  other hand,  it is not  prevented  from  applying to the 
same  judgments  one  of the  special  agreements  referred to  in 
Article  55  of the Brussels Convention,  which  may  contain 
rules  for the recognition and  enforcement  of  such  judgments. 
As  the first paragraph of Article  56  of the Brussels 
Convention  recognizes,  these  agreements  continue to  have 
effect  in relation to  judgments  to which the Brussels 
Convention  does  not  apply.  Since Article  l  of the Protocol 
of  3 June 1971  gives  the  Court  jurisdiction to  interpret  only 
the Brussels  Convention  and  the Protocol,  it is solely for 
the national  courts to  judge the  scope  of the  above-mentioned 
agreements  in relation to  judgments  to which  the Brussels 
Convention  does  not  apply.  This  may  lead to the  same 
expression in the Brussels  Convention  and  in  a  bilateral 
agreement  being interpreted differently. - 25  -
N  o  t  e 
In 1974  the  Tribunal de  Commerce  (Commercial  Cm:t.rt),  Brussels, 
ordered Bavaria and  Germanair to pay to Eurocontrol certain charges 
imposed in respect  of air traffic control.  Those  judgments,  which  were 
provisionally enforceable,  became  final after the  legal remedies  available 
in Belgium  had  been exhausted. 
On  the basis  of the  "Convention on  Jurisdiction and the  Enforcement 
of Judgments  in Civil and  Commercial Matters" Eurocontrol applied to the 
Landgericht  IYIUnchen  and the  Landgericht  Frankfurt  for the  enforcement  of 
the  above-mentioned  judgments. 
The  Oberlandesgericht  Mllnchen  and the  Oberlandesgericht  Frankfurt, 
to  which those  cases  were  referred,  ordered the  enforcement  of the Belgian 
judgments. 
Germanair  and Bavaria then appealed to the  Bundesgerichtshof,  which 
asked the  Court  of Justice to give  a  preliminary ruling  on the  following 
question: 
'~nder Article  56  of the  Convention do  the  Treaty and  Conventions 
rc~erred to  in Article 55  continue to have  effect  in relation to decisions 
which  do  not  fall under Article  1  (2)  of the  Convention but  are  excluded 
from the  scope  of application of the  Convention?" 
The  Convention provides as  follows: 
Article  1 
'~his Convention shall apply in civil and  commercial matters  •••• 
The  Convention shall not  apply to: 
1.  the  status or  legal capacity of natural persons,  rights 
in property arising out  of  a  matrimonial relationship  ••• , 
2.  bankruptcy,  proceedings relating to the  winding-up  of 
insolvent  companies  or other  legal persons,  judicial 
arrangements,  compositions  and analogous  proceedings; 
3.  social security; 
4.  arbitration." 
Article 55 
"Subject to the provlSlons  •••  of Article  56,  this Convention shall, 
for the  States  which are parties to it,  supersede the  following 
conventions  concluded between two  or more  of them: 
Article  56 
The  Convention between the Federal  Republic  of Germany  and 
the Kingdom  of Belgium  on the  Mutual  Recognition and 
Enforcement  of  Judgments,  Arbitration Awards  and Authentic 
Instruments in Civil and  Commercial  Matters,  signed at  Bonn 
on 30  June  1958." 
"The  Treaty and the  conventions  referred to  in Article  55  shall 
continue to  have  effect  in relation to matters to  which this 
Convent ion does  not  apply". - 26  -
In its  judgment  in Case  29/76  (LTU  Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH 
& Co.,  KG  v  Eurocontrol [T97£7  ECR  1541),  which  concerned charges  of a 
type  similar to those  involved in this instance,  the  Court  ruled that: 
(a)  In the  interpretation of the  concept  "civil and  commercial 
matters"  • • •  reference must  • • •  be  made,  first,  to the 
objectives and  scheme  of the  Convention and,  secondly,  to 
the  general principles which  stem from  the  corpus  of the 
national  legal  dystems; 
(b)  A  judgment  given in an action between a  public authority 
and  a  person governed by private  law,  in which the public 
authority has  acted in the exercise  of its powers,  is 
excluded  from the  area of application of the  Convention. 
Having  regard to all of the  foregoing provisions and  case-law the 
question referred asks basically whether  and to what  extent  the  legal 
concepts defined  by the  Court  within the  context  of the  Convention are 
binding upon national courts  and tribunals for the purposes of the possible 
application of a  bilateral agreement  in areas  which are  excluded  from 
the area of application of the  Convention. 
According to Article  56  (1)  of the  Convention,  rilateral conventions 
continue to have  effect  in relation to matters to which the  Brussels 
Convention does  not  apply. 
The  Brussels  Convention "shall apply in civil and  commercial 
matters"  (first paragraph of Article  1 ),  while the  convention between 
Germany  and  Belgium governs the  "Recognition of  Judgments  •••  in Civil 
and  Commercial Matters". 
In its judgment  in Case  29/76  (LTU  v  Eurocontrol)  the  Court 
interpreted the  words  "civil and  comm~ial matters" as  an  independent 
concept  and  not  as  a  reference to the  internal  law of  one  or other of 
the  states concerned. 
Since the Protocol of 3  June  1971  gave the  Court  of Justice 
jurisdiction to give  rulings  only  on the  interpretation of the  Convention 
and  of the  Protocol,  it is for national courts and tribunals alone to 
assess the  scope  of the  aforementioned agreements  with regard to  judgments 
which are  excluded  from  the  area of application of the  Convention. 
The  Court  has  ruled that the first  paragraph of Article 56  of the 
Convention does  not  prevent  a  bilateral convention such  as  the  convention 
between the  Federal Republic  of  Germany  and the  Kingdom  of Belgium referred 
to in the  sixth paragraph of Article  55  from  continuing to have  effect 
in relation to  judgments  which do  not  fall within the terms  of the 
second paragraph of Article  1  of the  Convention but  are  excluded from its 
area  of application. 
In its decision the  Court  emphasized that it was  aware  that the 
foregoing  conclusion may  lead to differing interpretations being made  of 
the  same  expression in the Brussels Convention and in a  bilateral convention 
as a  result  of the  difference existing between  systems  in which the  phrase 
"civil and  commercial rr1atters" is used. - 27  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
14  July 197] 
Robert  Bosch  GmbH  v  Hauptzollamt  Hildesheim 
Case  1/77 
1.  Common  Customs  Tariff - Value  for  customs  purposes  - Determination 
therecf - Criteria 
2.  Common  Custo:rts  Tariff  .....  Value  for  customs  purposes  - Detern1ination 
thereof -Normal price of goods  Value  of  a  patented process  -
Inclusion -Conditions 
(Regulation No.  803/68  of the Council,  Art.  3) 
1.  The  Common  Customs  Tariff concerns only the  import at ion of goods,  that 
is, tangible  property,  and does not  apply to the  importation of 
incorporeal  property  such as  processes,  services or  know-how. 
Therefore,  for the  purpose  of the  determination of the value for 
customs  purposes,  it is in principle necessary to  concentrate  only 
on  the  intrinsic value  of the article and to disregard the value  of 
processes,  which may  be  patented,  in which it  may  be  used. 
2.  The  result  of an  interpretation of Article  3  in accordance  with the 
objectives of the  basic provision laid down  by Article  1  of the 
regulation is that  a  patented process,  the  carrying out  of which 
constitutes the  only economically viable use of the  goods  and  which 
is only put  into effect  by the use  of those  goods,  is regarded as 
embodied in the  imported goods. 
Article  3  (1)  (a)  of Regulation No.  803/68  of the  Council  is to  ce 
interpreted as  meaning that the normal  price of goods  includes the value 
of a  patented process  where the  protected process is inseparably 
embodied in and constitutes the  only economically viable use  of the 
goods. 
N  o  t  e 
The  Finanzgerlcht  Hamburg  referred to the  Court  of Justice for  a 
preliminary ruling a  question concerning the  interpretation of Regulation 
(EEC)  No.  803/68  of the  Council  on the valuation of goods  for  customs 
purposes. 
The  question arose within the  context  of a  dispute  concerning the 
valuation for  customs  purposes  of a  COS  (east-on-strap)  machine  which is 
protected by a  product  invention patent  at  the  same  time  as  the  use  of 
that  machine  for the  process of manufacture  of terminal brides for  lead-
acid batteries is protected by a  process patent. 
The  question asks  whether the  patented process must  be taken into 
account  in determining the  "normal price",  that  is to say,  the  value  of 
the  machine  for  customs  purposes. 
The  Court  has  ruled that Article 3  (1)  of Regulation  (EEC)  No. 
803/68  of the  Council must  be  interpreted to mean that  the  normal price 
of goods  includes the value  of a  patented process  where  the  protected 
process is inseparably embodied in that  product  and constitutes the  only 
economically viable use  of it. - 28  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
15  October 1977 
Carlo  Tedeschi  v  Denkavit  Commerciale  s.r.l. 
Case  5/77 
1.  Questions referred to the  Court  for  a  preliminary ruling - Powers 
of the  Court  - Limits 
(EEC  Treaty,  Art.  177) 
2.  Agriculture  - Feedingstuffs - Additives  and undesirable  substances 
Distinction 
(Council  Directive  No.  70/524  of  23  November  1970  and  Council 
Directive  No.  74/63  of 17  December  1973) 
3.  Free movement  of goods  - Derogation laid down  by the Treaty -
Limitation- Harmonizing directive  - ~4Tticle 36  not  applicable 
4.  Agriculture  - Feedingstuffs -Undesirable  substances -Powers  of 
the Member  States 
(Directive  No.  74/63,  Art.  5) 
1.  Article 177  is based  on  a  distinct  separation of functions  between 
national  courts  and tribunals  on the  one  hand  and the  Court  of 
Justice  on the  other,  and it does  not  give  the  Court  jurisdiction 
to take  cognizance  of the facts  of the  case,  or to criticize the 
reasons for the reference.  Therefore,  when  a  national  court  or 
tribunal  refers a  provision of  Community  law for  interpretation, 
it is to be  supposed that the  said court  or tribunal  considers this 
interpretation necessary to  enable it to give  judgment  in the  action. 
Thus  the  Court  cannot  require  the national  court  or tribunal  to  state 
expressly that  the provision which  appears to that  court  or tribunal 
to call for  an interpretation is applicable.  The  Court  may  however 
provide  the national  court  with the factors  of interpretation 
depending  on  Community  law which might  be useful  to it in evaluating 
the effects of the provision which is the  subject-matter of the 
questions which have  been referred to it. 
2.  Directive  No.  70/524 (  additives)  and  Directive  No.  7  4/63  (undesirable 
substances)  although both relating to the  composition of feedingstuffs 
make,  as  regards their respective fields  of application,  a  distinction 
between  certain substances which  are  intentionally added to  those 
feedingstuffs  so  as  to produce  a  favourable  effect  on their character-
istics and,  on  the  other,  undesirable  substances  which  are  inevitably 
present  in those  feedingstuffs  either in the natural  state or as 
residues  from  processing previously undergone  by  those feedingstuffs - 29  -
or by the constituents  of those  feedingstuffs.  In these  circumstances 
a  substance which,  because  of a  previous  admixture,  independent  of the 
use  for  animal  feeding,  is necessarily present  in one  of the 
constituents  of the feedingstuff as  a  residue  from  the previous 
manufacture  of another product  may  not  be  considered as  an additive. 
The  control  of the presence  of  such  substances  comes  within Directive 
No.  74/63  (undesirable  substances)  and not within Directive No.  70/524 
(additives). 
3.  Article  36  is not  designed to reserve certain matters to the  exclusive 
jurisdiction of Member  States but  permits national  laws  to derogate 
from  the principle of the free  movement  of goods  to the extent to 
which  such derogation is and  continues to be  justified for the attain-
ment  of the  objectives referred to in that article.  Where,  in 
application of Article 100  of the Treaty,  Community  directives provide 
for the harmonization of the measures  necessary to ensure the protection 
of animal  and  human  health and establish Community  procedures to  check 
that  they are  observed,  recourse to Article 36  is no  longer  justified 
and the appropriate  checks must  be  carried out  and the measures  of 
protection adopted within the  framework  outlined by the harmonizing 
directive. 
4.  (a)  Even after the entry into force  of harmonizing Directive  No.  74/63, 
the Member  States have,  within the  context  of Article 5  of that 
directive  and  subiect to the material  and  procedural  requirements laid 
down  therein,  the  power provisionally to  consider as undesirable 
certain substances which,  although known  and  recognized when  that 
directive was  adopted,  do  not  appear in the list annexed thereto, 
provided that the measures  adopted  apply  on  identical terms to 
both national products  and to products imported  from  other Member 
States. 
(b)  Subject to the  obligation not  to discriminate between imported 
products  and national products,  Article 5 of Directive  No.  74/63 
enables  a  Member  State to fix,  on a  provisional basis,  the maximum 
permitted level  of  a  substance  contained in imported feedingstuffs 
made  from  powdered milk even though no  maximum  level has  ever been 
fixed in the past either in the exporting Member  State or in the 
importing Member  State. - 30-
(c)  Article  5  of Directive No.  74/63  enables  a  Member  State to 
prohibit the marketing of the products which have been found to 
infringe the temporary national provisions which it is empowered 
to  adopt.  For products  coming from  other Member  States  such 
prohibition on marketing may  take the  form  of a  prohibition on 
importation. 
N o  t  e 
What  is the  maximum  quantity of undesirable  substances  (undesirable 
from the  point  of view  of the  Community  rules)  which Community  producers 
may  still add to feeding-stuffs,  despite those rules?  That  is the 
question which was  referred to the  Court  of Justice of the European 
Communities  by the  Pretura di  Lodi  (Italy). 
The  feeding-stuffs  sector  has  been the  subject-matter of  several 
Community  directives aimed at  harmonizing the national provisions 
intended to ensure that  such  feeding~stuffs do  not  constitute a  danger to 
animal  and  human  health.  Among  these  are  Council Directive No.  70/524 
of 23  November  1970  (Official Journal,  English Special Edition  1970 
(III),  p.  840)  concerning additives  in feeding-stuffs  and Council 
Directive No.  74/63/EEC  of 17  December  1973  (Official Journal No.  L 
38of  11 Pebruary 1974,  p.  31)  on the fixing of maximum  permitted 
levels for undesirable  substances  and  products in feeding-stuffs. 
Under  Article  3  of Directive No.  74/63/EEC  Member  States shall 
prescribe that the  substances  and  products listed in the  Annex  shall 
be  tolerated in feeding-stuffs  only under the  conditions and up to the 
maximum  level fixed  by that  Annex.  Under  Article  7  of the Directive 
feeding-stuffs  which  conform to its provisions may  not  be  subject to  any 
other marketing restrictions as regards the  presence  of undesirable 
substances  and  products.  However,  Article  5  provides for a  safeguard 
clause,  which is worded as follows: 
1.  Where  a  Member  State  considers that  a  maximum  content  fixed in the 
Annex,  or that  a  substance  or  product  not  listed therein,  presents 
a  danger to animal or  human  health,  that  Member  State  may  provision-
ally reduce  this content,  fix a  maximum  content,  or forbid the 
presence  of that  substance  or product  in feeding-stuffs;  it shall 
advise the other  Member  States and the  Commissio: L  without  delay 
of the  measures taken and at  the  same  time  give  its reasons. 
2.  In accordance  with the  procedure  laid down  in Article  10,  an 
immediate  decision shall be  made  as to whether the  Annex  should  be 
modified.  So  long as no  decision has  been  made  by either the 
Council  or the  Commission  the  Member  State  may  maintain the 
measures  it has  implemented. 
The  procedure  laid down  in Article  10 involves  a  decision  by the 
Commission after consultation with the  standing Committee  for Feeding-stuffs. 
However,  if the  Committee  delivers no  Opinion,  or if the  Commission 
proposes to adopt  measures  which  are  not  in accordance  with the  Opinion, 
it  must  refer the  measures to the Council,  which  shall adopt  them  by  a 
qualified majority. 
If the  Council  has not  adopted any  measures  within fifteen days  of 
the  proposal  being submitted to it, the  Commission  shall adopt  the 
measures  in question and  implement  them forthwith,  except  where  the 
Council  has voted  by a  simple  majority against  them. - 31  -
Mr  Tedeschi,  the  plaintiff in the  main  action,  purchased from the 
Denkavit  company,  the  defendant  in the  main  action,  1,000 kg of feeding-
stuffs made  from  milk  powder  from the Netherlands,  to be  delivered in 
September  1976,  and  paid a  deposit  of 350,000  lire.  The  goods  were  not 
delivered because  they were  stopped at  the frontier  by the frontier 
veterinary officer in accordance  with an urgent  note  from the Italian 
Minister of Health of 7  September  1976  prohibiting the  importation of 
feedin~stuffs made  from milk  powder  or whey  containing more  than  30  and 
50  parts per  million  (mg  per kg)  respectively of nitrates. 
The  purchaser brought  an  action before the  Pretura di  Lodi  against 
the  defendant  in the  main  action for  refund of the  deposit  and  payment 
of damages.  Before that  court  both the  defendant  in the  main  action  and 
the  interveners  put  forward arguments  based on the  unlawful nature  of the 
prohibition on  importation. 
Since  it considered that  the  Community  rules relied on  before  it 
by the  parties to the  main action did not  clearly show  the  limit,s  of the 
powers  conferred upon the  Member  States,  the  Pretura di  Lodi  decided, 
by order of  17  December  1976,  to refer to the  Court  a  certain number  of 
questions  concerning the  exact  boundary between the  Community  rules and 
the  internal  law of the  Member  States. 
In reply,  the  Court  of Justice  has ruled that: 
Even  after the  entry into  force  of  harmonizing Directive No.  74/63 
the  Member  States have  the  power,  within the  context  of Article  5 
of that  directive  and  subject to the  material and  procedural 
requirements  laid down  therein,  to  consider  provisionally as 
undesirable  specific substances which,  although known  and recognized 
when  that  directive  was  adopted,  do  not  appear  in the  list  annexed 
thereto,  provided that  the  measures  adopted apply on identical terms 
to both national products  and to  products  imported from the  other 
Member  States; 
Subject  to the  obligation not  to discriminate  between  imported 
products and national products,  Article  5 of Directive No. 
74/63  enables a  Member  State to fix,  on  a  provisional basis,  the 
maximum  permitted level of a  substance  contained in feeding-stuffs 
made  from  imported milk  powder  even though no  maximum  level  has 
ever  been fixed in the  past  either in the  ex,,ort ing Member  State 
or in the  importing Member  State; 
Article 5 of Directive No.  74/63  enables  a  Member  State to 
prohibit the  marketing of the  products  which  have  been  found to 
infringe the temporary national  provision which it is empowered to 
adopt.  ?or products  coming from other Member  States such prohibition 
on  marketing may  take the form of a  prohibition on  importation; 
Consideration of the  fourth  q~estion has  disclosed no  factor of  such a 
kind as to affect  the validity of Article 5 of Directive No.  74/63. - 32  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
11  October 1977 
Peter Cremer  v  Bundesansta1t  fur 1andwirtschaft1iche Marktordnung 
Case  125/16 
1.  Agriculture -Common  organization of the markets -Compound feeding-
stuffs for cattle - Export  to third countries - Refund - Grant  -
Conditions - Application to  compound  feeding-stuffs  not  containing 
powdered milk 
(Regulation No.  171/64 of the  Commission) 
2.  Agriculture  - Common  organization of the markets - Compound  feeding-
stuffs for cattle - Export  to third countries - Refund - Grant 
Conditions - Composition of the product -Minimum  content 
(Regulation No.  166/64 of the  Council;  Regulation No.  171/64 
of the  Commission) 
1.  Export  refunds to third countries m~  under Regulation No.  171/64 
of the  Commission  of 30  October 1964 be granted for  compound  animal 
feeding-stuffs  containing either cereals or  cereal-based products  or 
milk or milk products. 
2.  Having regard to the  objectives of the  system  of export  refunds,  an 
export  refund for  a  compound  animal feeding-stuff  containing cereals 
or cereal-based products  can be  granted under Regulation No.  166/64 
of the  Council  of  30  October 1964  and  Regulation No.  171/64 of the 
Commission  only where  cereals or products to which Regulation No.  19 
of the  Council  of 4  April  1962  on  the progressive establishment  of  a 
common  organization of the markets in cereals applies  are in 
fact  contained in the mixture in significant proportions. - 33  -
N o  t  e 
The  Finanzgericht  (Finance  Court)  Hesse,  referred to the  Court  of Justice 
for  a  preliminary ruling a  series  of questions  on the  interpretation of 
Regulation No.  166/64/EEC  of the  Council  on  the  levy system applicable  to 
certain kinds  of  compound  animal  feeding-stuffs  (Journal Officiel  1964, 
p.  2747)  and  on the  interpretation and validity of Regulation No.  171/64/EEC 
of the  Commission  defining the  terms  for granting refunds  on  exports to third 
countries for  certain kinds  of  animal  feeding-stuffs  (Journal  Officiel  1964, 
P•  2758). 
In 1964  and  1965  a  German  company  exported approximately 3  metric tons 
of  a  product  described as  "animal  food treated with molasses  or  sweetened-
a  feeding-stuff for  swine"  from  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  to :Denmark, 
which  was  at  that  time  a  third country.  The  product  consisted of 73 % 
tapioca chips,  2 %  tapioca meal,  22  %  coarse  soya meal  and  3 %  mineral 
matter.  It  contained more  than  50 %  starch.  The  exporter obtained export 
refunds  in the  form  of licences authorizing the  importation free  of levy 
of a  quantity of cereals equal to the  quantity of the  processed products 
exported.  Those  licences  were  assigned to the  Cremer undertaking,  the 
plaintiff in the  main  action. 
An  inquiry by the  German  customs  investigation authorities  showed, 
in particular, that in :Denmark  most  of the  tapioca chips  were  sifted out  of the 
product  and then sold and delivered to an undertaking established in the 
Netherlands  which  was  legally connected with Cremer. 
As  a  result  of the  sifting out  of the  tapioca chips the  starch content 
fell below 50 %,  so that the  remaining product  no  longer satisfied the 
requirements necessary in order to benefit  from  the  refunds. 
The  Court  gave  the  following  answers  to the  questions referred to it: 
l.  Regulation No.  171/64/EEC  of the  Commission  of 30  October  1964 
defining the  terms  for  granting refunds  on  exports  to third countries 
of certain kinds  of animal  feeding-stuffs  also applies to  compound 
animal  feeding-stuffs  which  do  not  contain powdered milk; 
2.  An  export  refund  on  a  compound  feeding-stuff,  other than a  feeding-
stuff containing 50 %  or more  by weight  of powdered milk,  may  only be 
granted under Regulation No.  166/64/EEC  of the  Council  of  30  October 
1964  on the  levy system applicable  to  certain kinds  of  compound 
animal  feeding-stuffs  and Regulation No.  171/64/EEC  of the  Commission 
if the mixture  actually contains  a  substantial  quantity of the  cereals 
or products to which Regulation No.  19  of the  Council  of 4  April  1962 
on  the  gradual  establishment  of a  common  organization of the  market  in 
cereals applies; 
3.  For the  purposes  of the  application of the  coefficients listed in 
Annex A to Regulation  N~.  166/64/EEC  of the  Council,  the  starch 
content  of the  preparatlons referred to therein must  be  considered 
by reference to  t~e  com~ound feeding-stuff in its entirety and  not  by 
reference to the  lngredlents to  which Regulation No.  19  applied; 
4.  Con~ideration of the  questions raised has  disclosed no  factor of such 
a  klnd as  to affect  the validity of Regulation No.  166/64/EEC  of the 
Council. - 34  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
13  October 1977 
R.  Manzoni  v  Fonds  National de  Retraite des  Ouvriers Mineurs 
Case  112~ 
1.  Social  security for migrant  workers - Social  security benefits 
Overlapping- Limitation- Entitlement by virtue of a  national 
le9islation alone - Reduction- Prohibition 
tEEC  Treaty,  Art.  51;  Reaulation No.  1408/71  of the  Council,  Art.  46 
(3)) 
2.  Social security for migrant  workers - Insurance periods - Duplication -
Social  security benefits - Rules  against  overlapping - Application -
Condition 
(Regulation No.  1408/71  of the  Council,  Art.  46  (3)) 
1.  An  application of Article 46  (3)  of Regulation No.  1408/71  which would 
lead to  a  diminution of the rights which the persons  concerned  alre~ 
enjoy in a  Member  State by virtue of the application of the national 
legislation alone is incompatible with Article 51.  Article 46  (3) 
of Regulation No.  1408/71  is incompatible with Article 51  of the  Treaty 
to the  extent to which it imposes  a  limitation on benefits acquired in 
different Member  States by  a  reduction in the  amount  of  a  benefit 
acquired under the national legislation of a  Member  State  alone. 
2.  The  application of rules preventing the  overlapping of benefits where 
there is duplication of insurance periods is possible  only where  for the 
acquisition or  calculation of the worker's right it is necessary to 
have  recourse to aggregation of the  insurance periods  and  apportionment 
of the benefits. 
N o  t  e 
The  Tribunal  du Travail  (Labour  Tribunal),  Charleroi,  referred to the 
Court  certain questions  concerning the  interpretation of Article  51  of the 
EEC  Treaty and Article 46  (3)  of Regulation No.  1408/71  of the  Council  on  the 
application of social security schemes  to  employed persons  and their families 
moving within the  Community. 
The  main  action concerns  the  way  in which the  Belgian institution 
calculated the  invalidity pension  of the plaintiff in the  main action,an 
Italian worker,  who  satisfied in Belgium all the  conditions stipulated by the 
national legislation for  entitlement to  an invalidity pension under  the 
scheme  for  mine workers.  On  the  other hand,  in order to acquire  a  right 
to benefit in Italy,  where  he  had worked  for  more  than  5 years,  he  had to 
rely on  the  provisions  of Article  45  of Regulation No.  1408/71  and for the 
purpose  of calculating that benefit the  periods  completed in both Member 
States  were  aggregated and  a  proportion of the  Italian benefit  was  awarded. - 35  -
Relying upon the  rule  limiting benefits which is laid down  by Article 
46  (3)  of Regulation No.  1408/71,  the  Belgian institution took the  view that 
it was  entitled to reduce  the  invalidity pension by the  amount  of the  ~ro rata 
pension paid in Italy and  claimed the  reimbursement  of the  sum  overpai  • 
That  prompted the  Tribunal  du  Travail,  Charleroi,  to  ask the  Court  of 
Justice whether,  "if the  pension paid by the  Belgian State under  the present 
invalidity pension scheme  for  mine  workers  established by the Royal  Decree 
of 19  November  1970  and  subsequent  amending  decre~s is reduced  on  the basis 
of Article 46  (3)  of Regulation No.  1408/71  by reason of the benefits paid 
by other Member  States,  such reduction is in accordance  with Article  51  of the 
Treaty of Rome". 
Basing itself on  one  of its earlier decisions  (Case  24/75,  Petroni  v 
ONPTS  Ll97~ ECR  1149)  the  Court  ruled that Article 46  (3)  appears to be  a  rule 
imposing  a  limitation on  the  sum  of the various  pro rata benefits  and that 
the  Council,  in the  exercise  of the  powers  which it holds under Article  51 
concerning the  co-ordination of the  social security schemes  of the  Member 
States,  has  the  power,  in conformity with the  provisions  of the  Treaty,  to lay 
down  detailed rules for the  exercise  of rights to social benefits,  including 
invalidity benefits,  which the  persons  concerned derive  from  the  Treaty. 
However,  an application of Article 46  (3)  of Regulation No.  1408/71 
which would  lead to  a  diminution  of the rights which the  persons  concerned 
already enjoy in a  Member  State by virtue  of the  application of the national 
legislation alone  is incompatible  with Article  51  of the  Treaty. 
In conclusion,  the  Court  ruled that Article 46  (3)  of Regulation No. 
1408/71  is incompatible  with Article  51  of the  Treaty to the  extent to which it 
imposes  a  limitation on  the benefits acquired in different  Member  States by a 
reduction in the  amount  of the benefit  acquired under  the national legislation 
of one  Member  State  alone. - 36  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
13  October 1977 
Fbnds  National  de  Retraite des  Ouvriers Mineurs  v  G.  Mura 
Case  22/77 
Social security for migrant  workers  - Social security benefits -
Entitlement  by virtue of national legislation alone  - Full application 
of the latter - Advantages  of the system  - Aggregation and 
apportionment  - Preference 
Regulation No.  1408/71,  Art.  46  (1) 
So  long as  a  worker is receiving a  pension by virtue of national 
legislation alone,  the provisions of Regulation No.  1408/71  do  not 
prevent the national legislation,  including the national rules against 
the overlapping of benefits,  from  being applied to  him  in its entirety, 
provided that if the application of such national legislation proves 
less favourable than the application of the rules regarding aggregation 
and  apportionment  those rules must,  by virtue of Article 46  (1)  of 
Regulation No.  1408/71,  be  applied. 
N  o  t  e 
Like  Case  112/76  above,  this  case  is a  reference  for  a  preliminary ruling 
on  the  interpretation of Community  legislation with regard to national rules 
against  the  overlapping of benefits.  The  main  action  concerns  the  calculation 
by the  competent  Belgian institution of the  invalidity pension to be  awarded 
to  an  Italian national,  the  defendant  in the  main  action,  who  had  been 
employed  as  a  mine  worker  first  in France  and then in Belgium. 
He  satisfied all the  conditions  laid down  in Belgium for  entitlement 
to  an invalidity pension under  the  scheme  for  mine  workers  but  to acquire  a 
right  to  a  pension in France  he  had to rely on  the  provisions  of Article  45 
of Regulation No.  1408/71. 
The  Belgian institution applied the  national  rules  against  overlapping of 
benefits  and  subtracted the  theoretical  amount  of the  French pension.  That 
prompted the  Cour  du  Travail  (Labour  Court),  Mons,  to  ask the  Court  of 
Justice  whether Article  12  of Regulation No.  1408/71  authorizing the 
overlapping of benefits must  take  precedence  over national rules  against 
overlapping in cases  in which the  Community  provisions result  in a  migrant 
worker  being placed in a  more  favourable  position than a  worker  who  remains 
in  one  State. - 37  -
The  Court  made  the  observation that  any possible  differences  which may  exist 
to the benefit  of the migrant  worker  do  not  result  from  the  interpretation of 
Community  law but  rather  from  the  lack of any  common  social security system 
or of any harmonization of the  existing national  schemes,  the  consequences 
of which  cannot  be  mitigated by the  simple  co-ordination at  present 
practised. 
The  Court  reiterated the  reasoning which it used in its  judgment  in 
Case  24/75,  Petroni  v ~'  and replied by ruling that  so  long as  a  worker 
is receiving a  pension by virtue  of national  legislation alone,  the  provisions 
of Regulation No.  1408/71  do  not  prevent  the  national  legislation, 
including national rules against  the  overlapping of benefits,  from  being 
applied to  him  in its entirety,  provided that if the  application of such 
national  legislation proves  less  favourable  than the  application of the 
rules  on  aggregation and apportionment,  those  rules must  by virtue  of Article 
46  (l)  of Regulation No.  1408/71  be  applied. - 38  -
COURT  OF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
13  October 1977 
F.  Greco  v  Fonds National  de Retraite des Ouvriers Mineurs 
Case  37/77 
Social security for migrant  workers - Social  security benefits -
Entitlement  by virtue of national legislation alone - Full application 
of the latter - Advantages of the  system - Aggregation  and  apportionment 
Preference 
Regulation No.  1408/71,  Art.  46  (l) 
So  long as  a  worker  is receiving a  pension by  virtue of national 
legislation alone,  the provisions  of Regulation No.  1408/71  do  not 
prevent  the national legislation,  including the national rules against 
the overlapping of benefits,  from being applied to  him  in its entirety, 
provided that if the  application of  such national legislation proves 
less favourable than the  application of the rules regarding aggregation 
and  apportionment  those rules must,  by  virtue of Article 46  (1)  of 
Regulation No.  1408/71,  be  applied. 
N  o  t  e 
Since  the  issue in this  case  is identical to that  in Case  22/77  (~) 
above,  the  Court  has  given an identical  judgment. 
Cl-8/cl - 39  -
VISIT  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COURT  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS 
EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS 
(29  and  30  September 1977) 
At  the  invitation of the  Court  of Justice  of the  European  Communities, 
the  European  Court  of Human  Rights  and  a  delegation  from  the  European 
Commission  of Human  Rights visited Luxembourg  on  29  and  30  September 
1977-
Two  working  sessions presided over by Professor  Hans  Kutscher,  President 
of the  Court  of Justice,  Professor Giorgio  Balladore Pallieri,  President 
of the  Court  of  Human  Rights  and Mr  James  E.S.  Fawcett,  President  of the 
Commission of Human  Rights,  were  held. 
By  way  of introduction,  papers  were  given on  the  one  hand  by Mr  Max 
Sprensen,  Judge  of the  Court  of Justice,  and  on  the  other by Viscount 
Ganshof van  der Meersch,  Judge  of the  Court  of Human  Rights  and 
President  Fawcett  on  numerous  points  of  common  interest  in the 
functioning  and  case-law of these  courts. 
A wide-ranging discussion developed  on  fundamental  issues  such as  the 
difference between the  objectives  of the  European treaties and those 
of the  Convention  on  Human  Rights;  the  methods  of interpretation,  the 
application of general principles of law and,  in particular,  fundamental 
rights,  the  principles governing the  rule  of non-discrimination in the 
Convention and the  European treaties  and  so  forth. 
Previous meetings  between these  institutions took place  in 1971  and 
1973  in Luxembourg  and  Strasbourg.  The  usefulness  of these  contacts 
arises  from  the  fact  that both the  Court  of Justice  and the  institutions 
in Strasbourg are  called upon in the  context  of different  legal  systems 
to protect  fundamental  rights and thereby to harmonize  their conceptions 
and  working methods  in order to attain their  common  objectives. - 40  -
Welcome  by Mr  Kutscher,  President  of the  Court  of Justice 
Presidents, 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
In the  name  of all the  members  of the  Court  of Justice  of the 
European  Communities  I  have  the  honour  and great  pleasure  of wishing 
a  very hearty welcome  to the  members  of the  European  Court  and  Commission 
of Human  Rights  who  have  kindly accepted our  invitation.  The  only regret 
I  have  is that  such  a  lengthy period has  elapsed before  we  could return 
to your  institutions the hospitality which was  afforded us  in Strasbourg 
and  of which  we  have  retained such a  pleasant  memory. 
in the  aphorism:  better late than never! 
I  seek consolation 
It is hardly necessary to stress the  importance  of maintaining 
and  indeed augmenting the  contacts  between yourselves  and us  since after 
our  last meeting the  problems  of the  protection of  fundamental  rights 
have  been  considerably more  topical in the  context  of Community  law. 
It is sufficient  in this respect  to refer to the  Joint Declaration by 
the Parliament,the  Council  and the  Commission  of the  Communities  of 5 April 
1977,  a  declaration in which these  institutions solemnly stressed the 
prime  importance  which they attach to the  respect  of these rights. 
The  Declaration moreover  makes  reference both to the  European  Convention 
on  Human  Rights  and to the  now  established case-law of our  Court. 
Here  then we  are  confronted with a  common  task.  Our  respective 
institutions  have  to fulfil this task in the  context  of different  legal 
systems  which  have  not  been  co-ordinated inter se.  Obviously it is 
precisely this situation which  justifies and  indeed calls for  our 
discussing in  common  the  difficulties  which  could arise  from it. 
Original text  French Original text 
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I  am  very happy that  such  a  meeting  can take  place  today and  tomorrow. 
I  assume  that  the  papers  which  we  are  about  to hear will not  fail  to 
deal  with a  series  of aspects  of the  problem which  I  have  just 
mentioned.  But  I  do  not  wish to anticipate the matters  which will 
be  dealt  with by the  speakers.  Our  programme  provides  for  three 
papers,  which will be  given by Judges  Sprensen and  Ganshof van  der 
Meersch and by President  Fawcett. 
programme  we  can now  begin. 
With your  agreement  to this 
Paper by Mr  Max  Strensen,  Judge  of the  Court  of Justice,  President  of 
the  Second  Chamber 
MEETING  POINTS  BETWEEN  THE  EUROPEAN  CONVENTION  CN  HUMAN 
RIGHTS  AND  THE  LAW  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
The  international debate  on  human  rights is more  lively than 
ever  and new  elements  never  cease  to be  added.  One  of these  recent 
elements  which interests us  all and which  constitutes  an  appropriate 
starting point  for  our  exchange  of views  today is the  Joint  Declaration 
on  fundamental  rights adopted by the Parliament,  the  Council  and the 
Commission  of the  European  Communities  and  signed by the Presidents  of 
these  three  institutions  on  5 April  1977. 
The  content  of this Declaration may  be  summarized as  follows: 
After referring to the  fact  that  Community  law,  as the  Court  of 
Justice  has  recognized,  comprises  the  general principles of  law and in 
particular fundamental  rights,  and  observing that all the  Member  States 
are  Contracting Parties to the  European  Convention  for the  Protection 
of  Human  Rights,  the  three  institutions "stress the  prime  importance 
they attach to the  protection of fundamental  rights,  as  derived in 
particular  from  the  constitutions  of the  Member  States and the  European 
Convention  for the  Protection of  Human  Rights  ••• ". 
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The  Declaration concludes  by stating that  the  three institutions 
"in the  exercise  of their powers  and in pursuance  of the  aims  of the 
European  Communities  •••  respect  and will  continue to respect  these 
rights". 
The  legal  scope  of this Joint Declaration of the three  Community 
institutions has  been  queried,  since it is a  measure  which  does  not 
come  within the  categories provided for  by the treaties establishing 
the  Communities.  Replying recently to Parliamentary Question No. 
129/77  raised on  this matter,  the  Commission referred to the  support 
which the Declaration gives to the  case-law of the  Court  on  the  subject 
and  added:  "The  Declaration requires the  institutions to attach prime 
importance  to the  protection of fundamental  rights:  in cases  of doubt, 
this would lead them to interpret  legal acts adopted by them in 
conformity with  fundamental  rights." 
This  assessment  is no  doubt  correct.  To  go  further is risky. 
In any event  the Declaration does  not  mean  that  the  Communities  as 
such have  become  or  claim to have  become  Contracting Parties to the 
Convention for  the Protection of Human  Rights  (hereinafter called 
"the  Convention"),  something which is moreover  ruled out  by the  very 
terms  of the  Convention;  nor is  the Declaration the  equivalent  of a 
formal  incorporation of the  Convention into Community  law. 
2.  Both before  and  after the  adoption of the  Joint Declaration, 
Community  law and the  Convention  constitute  two  distinct  legal  spheres 
and the  procedures  provided to ensure  respect  for these  laws  are 
mutually independent. 
This  dualism  however  does  not  prevent  the  two  spheres  from 
meeting,  touching and  sometimes  partially overlapping.  The  explanation 
for this is quite  simple.  The  Convention in laying down  individual 
rights  which each contracting State is bound to recognize  as  enjoyed 
by everyone  coming under its  jurisdiction circumscribes the  exercise 
of public authority.  The  European  Communities,  for their part, 
and in particular the  Economic  Community  to which  I  will  confine - 43  -
myself in what  follows  have  been given a  share  of the public 
authority exercised by the  Member  States vis-a-vis their nationals. 
The  Court  of Justice in one  of its dicta which  has  become  classic, 
has  spoken of "a Community  •••  having  •••  real powers  stemming 
from  a  limitation of sovereignty or  a  transfer of powers  from  the 
States to the  Community  •••  albeit within limited fields  "  (Case 
6/64,  judgment  of 15  July 1964 ~  v ~  Ll96~ ECR  585  at p.593). 
In order to place  the  Convention in this  context it suffices 
to  observe  that  the  exercise by the institutions of the  Community 
of powers  thus  conferred is circumscribed and limited not  only by the 
provisions of the  EEC  Treaty but  also,  as  appears  from  the  case-law 
of the  Court  referred to in the Joint Declaration of 5  April  1977, 
by the  fundamental  rights  of individuals which may  be  deduced  from 
the general principles of law and  from  the  Convention. 
3.  The  concept  of general principles  of law as  a  source  of 
individual rights in the  Community  context is the  creation of the 
Court  but  may  be  regarded as  inherent  in the very logic of the 
Community  system.  The  powers  conferred on the  Community institutions 
cannot  in all logic exceed those  of the national legislatures.  In 
so  far  as national  constitutions  impose  by their list of fundamental 
rights restrictions  on  legislative power,  similar restrictions must 
be  respected by the  Community  institutions in exercise  of the  powers 
which  have  been conferred on  them.  It is true that  in the  sphere 
of fundamental  rights the  Court  has  not  expressly based itself on 
this doctrine  of transfer of powers,  but  in fashioning the  concept 
of "general principles of law" it has  adopted a  method  which  leads 
to the  same  result.  It has  directed itself towards  an  optimal 
standard and  has  respected those  fundamental  rights which are 
guaranteed by only a  limited number  or  even by a  single  one  of 
the national  constitutions.  Anxious  to avoid conflicts between - 44  -
the national  systems  of constitutional  law and  Community  law,  the 
Court  has  at  the  same  time  avoided the  difficulty of putting the 
principle  of the  primacy of  Community  law to the test. 
4.  This  recourse to the  general principles of law to  circumscribe 
the  powers  of the  Community  institutions has  been  completed,  as 
already mentioned·,  by the  reference  to the  Convention. 
The  doctrinal basis  for  doing this is quite  clear and simple, 
in any event  in the present  state  of the  case-law.  At  present  the 
nine  Members  of the  Community  are all Contracting Parties to  the 
Convention and  bound  by its provisions.  If in the  performance  of 
the  obligations arising from  such a  multilateral  Convention,  the 
Community is substituted for  the  Member  States,  the  Community  as  such 
is considered to be  bound by these  obligations.  In other words  the 
powers  of the  Community in matters  concerned with the  performance  of 
international  obligations assumed by Member  States are  themselves 
subject  to  those  obligations.  Whatever  the  solution which in 
international  law arises from  the  principles  of succession,  the 
Community  cannot  disregard the  obligations  of its Member  States in 
international  law. 
5.  At  this point  in our  analysis  of the  relations between  Community 
law and the  Convention  we  are  confronted with the  crucial  and,  in a  way, 
even preliminary question whether  the  powers  given to the  Community, 
concerned as  they are basically with economic matters,  are  really such 
as  to bring into question the  individual  rights  and  freedoms  defined 
by the  Convention.  Is the  power  to  regulate  economic  activities 
capable  of affecting the  liberty of the  subject,  private  and  family 
life,  freedom  of thought,  conscience  and religion,  freedom  of expression, 
freedom  to receive  and  impart  information and  so  forth?  Is not  one  of 
the  characteristics  of the  present  situation,  on  the  contrary,  that  the 
Community is not, or is not  yet,  a  political union  whDst  the  Convention 
for its part  does  not  cover  economic  and  social rights,  apart  from  the 
right to property referred to in Article  l  of the  Protocol? - 45  -
It is true that  any answer  to these  questions must  accept 
that  Community  law and the  Convention diverge  and  clearly differ 
with regard to their objectives  and the  subject matter dealt  with. 
This is a  fundamental  fact.  Nevertheless  there is no  complete 
separation.  There  is no  impenetrable barrier between the  two  spheres 
but  on the  contrary points  of contact  where  they meet. 
These  points  of contact  are  of two  kinds,  some  of a  marginal 
nature  others  concerned more  closely with fundamental  legal  phenomena 
of our  contemporary society. 
I  will  consider inthe first place  what  I  call the marginal 
questions. 
6.  The  Community  exercises  powers under regulations  over its 
officials  and  other servants.  Just  like Member  States with regard 
to national  civil servants the  Community  must  respect  their fundamental 
rights. 
In a  recent  case  (Case  130/75  Prais v  Council Ll97&7  ECR  1589) 
it was  recognized that  the  Community  had to respect  the right  to  freedom 
of religion enshrined in Article 9 of the  Convention.  When  a 
competition is being held for  the  recruitment  of officials the 
institutions should  on  principle avoid organizing tests  on  a  date  when 
a  candidate  would be  prevented from taking part  because  of his religious 
convictions  subject  however  to the  authorities  organizing the  competition 
having been informed in due  time  of such  an  impediment, something not 
done  in that  case. 
The  right  of association,  or more  particularly the  right  to 
join a  trade union,  as  defined in Article  11  of the  Convention may 
also  come  into question and  we  have  seen in regard to  a  case  relating 
to  a  scientific worker  of Euratom that  the  question  of  freedom  of 
expression of an official may  arise. - 46  -
These  examples  thus  disclose  a  point  of contact.  It should 
be  noted in passing however  that there  is  a  similar point  of contact 
in the relations between the  Convention  and the  law of other 
international  or at  least European organizations  which  are  also 
required in the  context  of international public administration to 
respect the  fundamental  rights of their officials. 
7•  In passing from  this specific sphere to the  powers  of the 
Communities  in their  own  sphere vis-a-vis the  nationals  of the  Member 
States it is possible  to  discern certain other actual  or  potential 
points  of contact. 
The  future  no  doubt  holds  for us  quite  a  number  of difficulties 
in the  sphere  of the  freedom to receive  and  impart  information provided 
for in Article  10 of the  Convention.  We  know  how  in our part  of the 
world the  communication  of information by the press  and to  a  lesser 
degree  by electronic means  is a  function of private enterprise  and 
forms  part  of economic  and  commercial  activities.  To  regulate 
competition in this sphere  in terms  both of economic  factors  and the 
freedom  of information will not  always  be  an  easy task.  The  cases 
which we  have  had both in Strasbourg and  Luxembourg relating to  cable 
television have  given us  only a  slight  foretaste  of the  problems  which 
are  going to arise. 
8.  Returning to every-day matters  we  find points of contact  in 
the  sphere  of migrant  workers.  Although originally the  EEC  Treaty 
conceived "the  free  movement  of workers"  from  a  basically economic 
aspect,  subsequent  developments  have  stressed the  social  and  human 
aspects.  It is true that  the  most  important  questions  such as  the 
right  of residence  in the  host  State,  conditions  of employment,  social 
security,  housing and the  educational  system  for  children are  outside 
the  scope  of the  Convention.  Nevertheless  other questions  concerning 
migrant  workers  could bring into  question the rights  defined by the 
Convention such as  respect  for  private  and  family life guaranteed by 
Article 8.  The  same  could happen regarding certain guarantees  provided 
for under Article  6  as  regards procedure  in criminal  cases. - 47  -
9.  The  problems  of migrant  workers  have  enabled us  to  observe 
how  in practice  Community  law interferes with the  Convention. 
The  following is the  procedure  in a  typical  case.  The 
worker  alleges that  a  measure  taken in respect  of him  by the 
authorities of the  host  country infringes his rights under  Community 
provisions  and the  Convention.  A  case  is brought  and the national 
court  makes  a  reference to the  Court  of Justice  for  a  preliminary 
ruling on the  interpretation or validity of the provision of Community 
law in question.  The  Court  considers  the  problems  of interpretation 
or the  question of validity on  the basis not  only of actual  Community 
law,  including the  general principles of law,  but  also where  appropriate 
of the  Convention as  involving international  law which the  Community is 
bound to respect.  Its reply to the  question referred for  a  preliminary 
ruling thus takes account  of the  Convention and this reply is binding 
on the national  court  which finally gives  a  ruling in the  action brought 
by the  worker. 
If however,  at this stage,  the individual  considers that  his 
rights under  the  Convention have  been infringed,  it is open to him, 
after exhausting national  avenues  of appeal,  to bring the matter before 
the  Commission,  provided that the  State in question has  recognized the 
right  of action for  a  private person under Article 25. 
To  my  knowledge  this last step  (appeal to  Strasbourg after a 
reference  for  a  preliminary ruling to Luxembourg)  has  not  so  far been 
taken.  It appears to me  very unlikely that it ever will be  but  the 
possibility must  be  recognized as  existing in principle. 
10.  The  examples  cited show the  circumstances in which the  Court 
of Justice may  be  called upon  to interpret  and  apply the  Convention. 
Seen  from  the perspective  of the  Convention this does  not  seem  to me 
in any way  extraordinary.  Vis-a-vis  the  institutions atStrasbourg 
the  Court  of Justice is in a  position comparable  to that  of national - 48  -
courts.  The  national  case-law on  the  Convention is already copious. 
A contribution from  the  Court  of Justice  would not  be  I  hope 
unwelcome.  In any event it is apparent  that  the  last  word  on  the 
questions  of interpretation relating to the  Convention will  always 
rest  with the  Court  of Human  Rights. 
ll.  I  could  continue  at  length on  the  examples  and the  hypotheses 
of what  I  have  called the marginal  points  of contact.  But  I  prefer 
to  consider the  more  fundamental  points  of contact. 
It is no  longer  a  question of situations where  the  same  facts 
may  simultaneously be  classified under  one  or  other  category of rules. 
I  have  in mind  certain general  concepts  and methodological  attitudes 
which are  common  to the  two  systems.  It is possible  to  speak of 
common  doctrines. 
The  example  which  comes  immediately to mind is the  doctrine  of 
discrimination.  There  is no  need to mention the  focal  position occupied 
by the  different prohibitions  on  discrimination in Community  law and 
in the  Convention.  The  formulation of the  concept  of discrimination 
by the  Commission  and the  Court  of  Human  Rights  as  a  result  of the 
work  done  in the  United Nations  and in the  context  of national  legal 
systems  has  striking parallels in Community  law.  The  formula  adopted 
by the  court  in the  Belgian  language  case  has  left its mark  on  the 
case-law of the  Court  of Justice.  I  havein mind especiallythe  following 
passages  from  the  judgment  of 23  July 1968: 
"•••  the  Court,  following the principles which may  be 
extracted from  the  legal practice  of a  large  number  of 
democratic States,  holds  that the  principle  of equality 
of treatment  is violated if the distinction has  no 
objective  and reasonable  justification.  The  existen~e 
of such  a  justification must  be  assessed in relation to 
the  aim  and effects  of the  measure  under  consideration, 
regard being  had to the  principles which normally prevail 
in democratic  societies.  A difference  of treatment  in - 49  -
the  exercise  of a  right  laid down  in the  Convention 
must  not  only pursue  a  legitimate  aim:  Article  14 
is likewise violated when  it is clearly established 
that  there is no  reasonable  relationship of proportionality 
between the  means  employed  and the  aim  sought  to be 
realized." 
12.  Another  example,  this time  derived  from  a  doctrine  in process 
of formation rather than already well  worked  out  is the  phenomenon 
which in German  is called the  "Drittwirkung",  that  is to say the 
restrictive effect  on  certain natural  or legal persons  of provisions 
which by their context  appear to be  addressed  only to State authorities. 
This  was  the  view taken by the  Court  of Justice  in Case  36/74, 
Walrave  and  Koch  v  Union  Cycliste  Internationale  and Others Ll9717 
ECR  1405.  In reply to the  question whether  the  rules  of a  sporting 
federation  could be  regarded as  incompatible  with the  provisions of 
the  EEC  Treaty on  the  free  movement  of persons  and the  freedom to 
provide  services,  the  Court  held that  the prohibition on  discrimination 
in this sphere  applies not  only to the  action of public authorities but 
extends  likewise  to rules  of any other nature  aimed at  regulating in a 
collective manner gainful  employment  and the provision of services. 
The  Court  said that the  objective  of the  Treaty would be  compromized 
if the abolition of barriers of national  origin could be  neutralized by 
obstacles resulting from  the  exercise of their legal  autonomy by 
associations  or  organizations  which  do  not  come  under public  law. 
The  problem  has  been raised before  the  Commission  and the  Court 
of Human  Rights  by cases  concerned with Swedish trade  unions.  The 
Court,  following the  Commission  on this point  held that Article ll of 
the  Convention  on  Human  Rights  concerning freedom  to  form  and to  join 
trade unions  applied to States not  only in the  exercise  of public 
authority but  also  as  employers.  The  Court  added  however  that it did 
not  think that it had to give  a  ruling on  the  direct  or indirect 
applicability of Article ll as  between individuals stricto  sensu. 
The  question therefore  remains  open. - 50  -
The  power  of professional  and trade union organizations  in 
our  society is an  accepted fact.  To  circumscribe  the  exercise 
of this power to protect  the rights of the  individual may  be 
necessary.  It appears  to me  highly desirable  that  in such a 
matter  our respective  courts  should adopt  similar solutions. 
13.  I  come  finally to the  most  difficult problem in my  opinion 
in relation to the  protection of fundamental  rights,  a  problem which 
arises in similar, if not  identical,  terms  in Community  law and 
in the  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  I  refer to the restrictions  and 
limitations  on individual rights  and  freedoms. 
The  various  instruments require us  to recognize  the  existence 
of such restrictions and limitations.  Are  there,  outside  those 
instruments,  limitations inherent  in certain legal relationships in 
our  society?  The  Commission  and the  Court  of  Human  Rights  have 
recently considered this question in relation to military service. 
Following the  general principles of  law the  Court  of 
Justice  for its part  has  observed that the right to property and the 
freedom  to work  are  only guaranteed subject  to the  limitations provided 
for  in the  public interest.  Moreover  in many  cases relating to the 
free  movement  of persons the  Court  has  had to  consider the  concept  of 
"public policy"  and  the  limitations which it could  justify according 
to the  Community  rules.  It  has  stated that the  Convention also uses 
this concept,  but  to  justify only those  restrictions which constitute 
necessary measures  in a  democratic  society. 
Examining this last criterion more  closely the  Court  of Human 
Rights in the  Handyside  case  set  out  important  considerations which, 
while  directly concerning  only  freedom  of expression,  go  further. 
I  really must  cite them verbatim: - 51  -
"The  Court's  supervisory functions  oblige it to pay the 
utmost  attention to the  principles characterising a 
'democratic society'.  Freedom  of expression constitutes 
one  of the  essential  foundations  of such a  society,  one  of 
the basic conditions  for its progress  and  for  the 
development  of every man.  Subject  to paragraph 2  of 
Article  10,  it is applicable not  only to  'information'  or 
'ideas'  that  are  favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive  or as  a  matter  of indifference,  but  also to 
those that  offend,  shock or disturb the  State  or  any sector 
of the  population.  Such are the  demands  of that  pluralism, 
tolerance  and broadmindedness  without  which there is no 
'democratic society' •  This  means,  amongst  other things, 
that  every  'formality',  'condition',  'restriction'  or 
'penalty'  imposed in this sphere  must  be  proportionate to 
the  legitimate  aim  pursued. 
From  another standpoint,  whoever  exercises his  freedom  of 
expression undertakes  'duties and responsibilities'  the 
scope  of which  depends  on  his situation and the  technical 
means  he uses.  The  Court  cannot  overlook such a  person's 
'duties'  and  'responsibilities'  when  it enquires,as in this 
case,  whether  'restrictions'  or  'penalties'  were  conducive 
to the ~rotection of morals'  which made  them  'necessary' 
in a  'democratic society'."  (Judgment  of 7 December  1976,  para. 
49). 
14.  From  these  words  and  man~  others  which our respective  courts 
have  used in relation to the  fundamental  rights of the  individual  we 
see  a  phenomenon  revealed which is common  to us  and  which in the  last 
analysis is the  most  important meeting point.  The  application of 
the  law is not  an automatic  or mechanical  process. 
choices  determined by value  judgments. 
It involves - 52  -
President  Wiarda in a  study published  some  fifteen years 
ago  referred to the  three types  of legal activity described by 
Montesquieu.  In republics,  said Montesquieu,  law is perfect  and  complete, 
judges  "are  only the mouthpieces  which pronounoe ••• be:ir.gs which  can moderate 
neither the  force  nor the  rigour of it".  The  opposite  pole is the 
despotic State  where  there  are  no  laws  and  where  "the  court  is a 
law until itself".  Between these  two  extremes  there  are 
constitutional monarchies:  "There  is a  law;  where  it is well 
defined the  judge  follows it;  where it is not  he  looks  for its 
spirit". 
Whether  we  are  republicans  or monarchists  we  must  recognize, 
I  think,  that  the  judicial functions  entrusted to us  come 
essentially under the  last  category.  Where  there  is imprecise 
wording  we  must  look for  the  spirit of Community  law and  of the 
Convention.  Whether  the  task is tackled in Strasbourg or  Luxembourg 
the  spirit is the  same.  To  translate this spirit into legal  decisions 
is a  formidable  task from  the  angle  of the  "Nine"  as  from  that  of the 
"Nineteen".  If we  do  not  succeed in the  spirit of the  instruments in 
establishing an  equilibrium between  freedom  and discipline,  between 
rights  and  duties of individuals  towards  society the  future  of our 
western civilization is perhaps at risk. 
15.  We  need to help  one  another,  consult  one  another  and  to act 
together.  This process  has  given rise to much  thought  at  an  academic 
level.  The  publication due  soon  of the  symposium  organized by the 
Max  Planck Institute in Heidelberg last year will bear  eloquent 
witness to it.  Plans multiply,going as  far  as  providing for  the 
institution of procedures  for references  for  a  preliminary ruling 
between the  two  Courts.  At  our  level preference  ought  perhaps  to be 
given to more  simple  and thus  more  realistic means.  To  improve  the 
reciprocal  information between  our  secretariats, registries,  and 
research and  documentation departments  and  at  an unofficial  level 
between the  members  of our institutions,  would  constitute  a  first 
step.  And  why  not  provide  in future, when  our  other engagements 
permit, the  organization  of  joint discussions  in the  form  of symposia 
or other informal meetings  on  selected topics  such as  discrimination, 
public policy and  so  forth. 
Meeting points  abound. ·iginal text 
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Paper by Mr  Ganshof van der Meersch,  Judge at the European  Court 
of Human  Rights 
QUESTIONS  OF  COMMON  INTEREST  WHICH  MAY  FORM  THE 
SUBJECT  OF  EXCHANGES  OF  VIEWS  AND  INFORMATION 
A  Preliminary considerations 
1.  The  questions  which are of such a  nature as to  concern both the 
Court  of Justice of the  European  Communities  and the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  are many.  Among  them are  certain areas in which 
harmonization is necessary.  These  questions  concern the basic content 
of the  law and,  although they deal with respect  for the human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms  which appear in the  Rome  Convention,  it is for 
both  Courts to protect  the rights and  freedoms  which make  up this common 
body of law. 
Among  those questions  reference may  be made  to: 
(i)  the rule against  discrimination; 
(ii)  the reservation based on public policy; 
(iii)  the principle of proportionality; 
(iv)  the general principles of law. 
Those  questions are  capable of receiving separate and different 
interpretations in the  case-law of the two  Courts. 
2.  There are also  problems  - and  clearly they are the main ones  - of 
interpretation which arise before the two  Courts  both as to method and 
procedure. 
In that area  reference may  be made  to: 
(i)  the problems  inherent  in the teleological interpretation and 
in the  evoluti  ve interpretation; 
(ii)  the useful effect  rule and the effictiveness rule; 
(iii)  the interest in a  uniform interpretation and the strict or 
relative nature  of that uniformity; 
(iv)  the reference  for interpretation by means  of a  preliminary 
ruling; 
French 
(v)  the legal basis for the protection of  human  rights  by the 
Court  of Justice of the European  Communities. -54-
3.  ~om that brief list of a  certain number  of questions - which are 
far from  being the  only ones to  demonstrate the area of interest  common 
to the two  Courts  - it is clear that  a  satisfactory study of them  cannot 
be made  in the short time available.  Thus,  in the mind of the author, 
the  aim  of this paper is merely to indicate,  for  each question,  the 
problems  which appear to  exist at  present,  to add a  few brief remarks 
and  some  references to case-law.  The  author is purposely refraining 
from  any consideration of legal philosophy,  since he  considers that  the 
task which  he has  been asked to  undertake is limited to  drawing up  a 
list on which the  judges called upon to  consider the questions  referred 
to may  reflect.  It will be  for the two  Courts to  decide  on how  the 
exchanges  of views  organized in 1973  and re-opened today are to  be 
organized in future  so  as to enable the questions which they consider 
important  to be  studied.  The  author of the present  paper expresses 
his personal wish that  such  exchanges  of views  may  be  organized on a 
permanent  basis and as regularly as possible. 
4.  Before  dealing briefly with the problems referred in paragraphs  1 
and 2  of the  present  paper,  I  would like to make  three observations  which 
may  perhaps  explain generally certain differences of scope in the 
application of provisions  or rules which normally derive  from  a  single 
principle: 
(i)  The  objectives of the  Convention and those of the  EEC  (1)  are 
fundamentally different:  whilst the purpose of the  Convention is to 
protect the individual against  improper interference  by  governmental 
bodies within the  Contracting states and,  in special cases,  to  acknowledge 
certain positive duties which are  incumbent  upon the  states  (2),  the 
intention of the  Community,  without  prejudice to those of its aims  which 
are of a  social nature,  is to modify the economic  relationships between 
the Member  states through the gradual  integration of their economies  and 
the pooling of certain of their powers  and competences,  so  as to satisfy 
the  common  interests of the Member  states and o: their nationals. 
Furthermore,  through the intervention of its institutions,  it exercises 
powers  which  lead to the provision of "contributions" by the Member 
states and by individuals. -55-
(ii)  Because its objectives are principally economic  in nature, 
the field of human  rights dealt  with by the  Community  appears  less 
extensive than that  covered by the  Convention.  Furthermore,  the 
institutional system and the rules of procedure,  as  supplemented by 
practice,  have  established a  balanced system of checks  and counter-
poses  which  so  far have  only rarely given rise to disputes  concerning 
the violation of human  rights.  In addition,  the  Court  of Justice in 
Luxembourg  deals with the matter from  the  point  of view of  Community 
law,  while the  Court  in strasbourg keeps its eyes  firmly fixed on the 
national  law.  Finally,  when the  Court  of Justice of the European 
Communities  deals with human  rights it does  not  do  so  as  a  direct  result 
bf the treatment  meted out  by the Member  states to their nationals but 
rather in the process of assessing the effects of the measures  adopted 
by the institutions,  which are the agents  of the central  Community 
authority. 
(iii)  Nevertheless,  the list of differences which  I  have  just 
rapidly drawn  up must  not  allow us to  lose sight of the  fact  that the 
action which must  result in the achievement  of the objectives of the 
Community  may  be associated,  in legal or factual situations which 
cannot  be  dealt  with systematically here,  with the field of human  rights 
protected by the  Convention.  Apart  from rights and  freedoms  of a 
strictly physical nature,  those which  cannot  be  called into question 
by the  Community  institutions,  either in the field of legislation,  or 
of the  powers  inherent in the  Community,  are rare. 
Allow me  to refer to the  conclusive evidence  on that  point  provided 
by  a  recent  judgment  of the  Court  of Justice,  confirming the principle 
of respect  for  freedom  of religion which the applicant  maintained had 
been violated (3).  Is it rash to believe that  the same  might  apply, 
in particular,  as  regards respect  for a  person's private life,  freedom 
of thought  or expression,  freedom to receive and impart  information 
and freedom  of association? -56-
I  shall moreover not  lose  sight  of the vast  social field - so 
close to the field of human  rights - which has,  until now,  rarely 
been mentioned in an examination of these  problems.  Social integration 
is less advanced than economic  integration and it is reasonable to 
think that  important  developments will take place in that  sphere in 
the  future.  In that  respect  one  cannot  underestimate the ambitious 
programme  outlined in the  Preamble to the  Treaty,  the terms of which 
I  should like to recall: 
"Resolved to ensure the  •••  social progress  of their countries 
by  common  action to eliminate the barriers which  divide  Europe, 
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant 
improvement  of the  living and working  conditions of their peoples". 
B  Observations  on  certain questions which arise out  of a  comparison of the 
Treaty establishing the EUropean Economic  Community  and the ~opean 
Convention on  Human  Rights 
(i)  The  principle that  Community  law shall be  interpreted uniformly, 
to which reference has  been made  above,  is linked in some  measure to the 
rule against  discrimination,  laid down  both in the  Convention and in the 
EEC  Treaty.  Here  again differences  exist  between the two  systems. 
In the Treaty of Rome  the principle that there shall be  no 
discrimination is laid down  in relation to specific fields.  It is 
acknowledged in Article 7 as  regards nationality (4).  It is laid down 
in Article  119  as  regards the principle that men  and women  should receive 
equal  pay.  However,  on a  material  level the  Court  of Justice 
recognizes the general nature of the principle.  It  considers that  the 
rule must  be applied to  an assessment  of any legal relationship (5). 
The  Court  confirmed that the principle is imperative  and general in nature 
by referring to "equality of treatment" which is the positive  concept 
corresponding to the rule against  discrimination  (6).  It considers, 
however,  that it cannot  be  discriminatory to  apply,  in its external 
relations,  a  positive rule of the Treaty to certain states and not  to 
apply it to others  (7).  Obviously,  it would  be  difficult to  find 
similar situations within the sphere of application of the  Convention on 
Human  Rights,  but  one wonders  whether the principle under which  such a 
decision is adopted is not  contrary to Article  14  of the  Convention which, -57-
as  regards the rights and  freedoms  which it acknowledges,  clearly 
establishes the general nature of the rule against  discrimination on 
a  geographical  level.  On  the  other hand,  the  Court  in strasbourg 
does  not  basically interpret the general principle against 
discrimination as strictly as  does the  Court  of Justice of the 
European  Communities.  It has  on several occasions  set  out  its 
guiding principles on that  subject,  which are directly influenced by 
the foregoing consideration.  It takes the view that  the  Convention 
does  not  allow the  Court  to  "disregard those  legal and  factual  features 
which characterize the life of the society in the  state which,  as  a 
contracting party,  has to  answer  for the measure in dispute"  (8). 
After stating in the  Case  relating to certain aspects of the  laws 
on the use of languages  in education in Belgium  (9)  that  "Article 14 
does  not  forbid every difference in treatment in the exercise of the 
rights and freedoms  recognized",  the  Court  of Human  Rights  took into 
account  the fact  that  "the competent  national authorities are frequently 
confronted with situations and  problems  which,  on account  of differences 
inherent therein,  call for different  legal solutions",  and concluded that 
it "holds that the principle of equality of treatment  is violated if 
the  distinction has  no  objective and reasonable  justification" and that 
"the existence of such  a  justification must  be assessed in relation to 
the aim  and effects of the measure  under  consideration,  regard being 
had to the principles which  normally prevail in democratic  societies". 
It restated that  position of principle in the  judgment  in the  National 
Union of Belgian Police case  (10),  in which it referred to the text  of 
its remarks  in the aforementioned case after making the general statement 
that  "it is not  every distinction  that  amounts  to  discrimination". 
It returned to that  point  in the  case of Engel  and  others,  in which it 
was  claimed that the disciplinary rules inherent in military service 
involved discrimination.  The  Court  stated that  "such inequalities are 
traditionally encountered in the  Contracting states and are tolerated by 
international humanitarian law" and concluded that  "in this respect,  the 
European  Convention allows the  competent  national authority a  considerable 
margin of appreciation".  ( 11) -58-
(ii)  The  reservation based on public policy,  which involves  a 
derogation from  certain legal positions,  particularly in the area of 
fundamental  rights,  is clearly stated by both  Courts  and,  on that  point 
again,  different  interpretations are made. 
In the EEC  Treaty the concept is formally expressed in Articles 
48  (3)  and 56,  which  concern free movement  of workers  and the right  of 
establishment  respectively.  The  reservation based on public policy is 
associated therein with the  requirements  of "public security or public 
health".  The  Court  of Justice has  held that  "in the context  of the 
Community  and where,  in particular, it is used as  a  justification for 
derogating from  the  fundamental  principle of freedom  of movement  for 
workers" it  ''must  be interpreted strictly"  (12).  It is,  of course,  for 
the Member  state to determine the requirements of public policy referred 
to  by the  Treaty in order to  justify a  limitation on the principle of 
the free movement  of persons  which is a  general principle of  Community  law 
and a  fundamental  right  of the individual,  but the  concept  of public 
policy must  be  assessed with reference to the  Community  legal order and 
not  on the basis of the view taken by the national  law of the  state in 
question.  Furthermore,  the  exception to the rule must  generally be 
interpreted strictly.  That  is particularly true in the area of human 
rights and  fundamental  freedoms. 
The  concept  of public policy,  which appears in the  form  of a 
derogation from  the guarantee  which attaches to an individual right,  is 
both narrower and more  strict in the case-law of the  Court  of Justice 
than in the  case-law of the  European  Court  of Human  Rights.  Like the 
European  Commission of Human  Rights,  the latter ellows the  Contracting 
states a  fairly wide  area of discretion as  regards the  concept  of public 
policy in their national  law.  It must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that 
each time that the derogation appears,  it must  be  assessed within the 
limits to which it may  go  "in a  democratic  society",  which reduces its 
field of application socially,  politically and legally.  That  general 
limit  on any derogation from  the principle of the protection of the rights 
and  freedoms  laid down  in the  Convention is directly echoed in the  Preamble 
to that  document,  which refers to  "an effective political democracy". -59-
"Public policy" is not  expressly referred to in the  Convention 
(13).  However,  the  concept  of the general interest,  elevated to the 
level of a  mandatory requirement,  as a  result  of which it comes  near 
to the  concept  of  jus  cogens in international law,  appears in several 
of the articles of the  Convention in the  form  of descriptive references 
(14).  Those  references  include "national security",  "public safety", 
the "economic well-being of the  country",  the "prevention of disorder 
or crime",  the "protection of health or morals" and the "protection of 
the rights and  freedoms  of others".  The  Contracting Parties considered 
those matters to  be  so vital to the general interest that they allow of 
restrictions on  certain specific freedoms  provided for in the  Convention, 
provided always that  such restrictions are "necessary" in a  democratic 
society.  The  questions  whether those interests are such as  to justify 
the derogations  and whether the derogations  are necessary are assessed 
by reference to national  law and to the situation existing within the 
state or  states in question. 
(iii)  We  touch here  on one  of the  ma11Y  forms  in which the general 
principle of proportionality appears  in the application of the  Convention. 
In the  Community  legal order the principle of proportionality is 
the  duty to maintain due  proportion between the reaction of the  Community 
authority and the unlawful action which gives rise to it (15).  The 
Court  of Justice expressed its view in the  judgment  in Hauts  Fourneaux 
de  Chasse,  when it stated that the High  Authority could not  "ignore the 
special interests of those  concerned and act  so  harshly that  those 
interests are  compromised very much  more  than can reasonably be  expected". 
It "is bound to act  with all the  circumspection and care required to 
balance and assess the various,  often conflicting,  interests involved 
and to avoid harmful  consequences in so  far as,  within reason,  the nature 
of the  decision taken permits"  (16). -60-
However,  situations also  exist in which  the principle has  appeared 
less clear and systematical.  Thus,  the  Court  has  drawn attention to 
the obligation on the  Council  (or the  Commission)  to make  an overall 
assessment  of the various advantages  and  disadvantages  of measures to 
be introduced in relation to the  individual circumstances  of particular 
sectors of activity,  as well as to take account  of the multiplicity of 
individual economic  situations  (17). 
The  European  Court  of Human  Rights  has  also referred on several 
occasions to the general principle of proportionality.  It has  done  so 
chiefly in relation to the prohibition of discrimination,  that is,  by 
associating it with Article  14  of the  Convention.  The  Court  explained 
what  it understands  by the requirements  of proportionality in relation 
to that  subject  when it stated in the  Belgian language  case that  "a 
difference of treatment  in the exercise of a  right  laid down  in the 
Convention must  not  only pursue  a  legitimate aim:  Article  14  is likewise 
violated when it is clearly established that there is no  reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means  employed and the  aims 
sought  to  be realized"  (18).  However,  the  Court  of Human  Rights  has 
also  looked to the general principle of proportionality when  fixing the 
limits of the  derogations  from  the principles of freedom  of expression 
and  freedom to receive  and impart  information  (Article  10  (2)),  when  it 
is required to assess  "necessary measures"  (19)  and when  defining the 
exceptions to the obligations for which the  Convention provides  "in time 
of war  or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation", 
provided that they are "strictly required by the exigencies  of the 
situation"  (20). 
Although the general principle of proportionality is applied on 
different  levels  by the two  Courts,  it is interpreted in ways  which  are 
very similar and appear to  be inspired by the  rule of reasonableness  in 
the  common  law. 
(iv)  The  Court  of Justice frequently calls in to the general 
principles of law as  a  source of  Community  law and these also  guide it 
in the interpretation of  Community  law.  From  surveys  of the  case-law of 
the  Court  of Justice one  can apparently,  even without  being too  systematic, 
distinguish three categories of general  principles:  first,  those  which 
are  common  to all legal  systems,  secondly,  those  which  derive  from  the -61-
law of the Member  states and,  thirdly,  the general  principles of 
Community  law stricto sensu.  The  first  are to  be  found  on  ~ 
universal level.  Those  which fall into the second category are tak0n 
from  the internal  law  common  to the Member  states and,  in the  process  of 
fusion into  Community  law,  stripped of their national elements.  They 
are also to be  found in the international undertakings  entered into and 
ratified by all the Member  states.  Finally,  the general principles of 
Community  law are inherent in that  law.  They are  deduced  from  a 
certain number  of specific rules  which  expressly or impliedly reside in 
the Treaty itself,  such as,  in particular,  the principles of solidarity 
of the Member  states and of the unity and effectiveness  of  Community  law. 
The  Court  of Justice considers that the general principles of law 
are  suppletive in nature.  They  are  suppletive in relation to the terms 
of the  Treaty,  in their context  and the light of its subject-matter and 
object  (21).  As  Mr  Advocate  General  Dutheillet  de  Lamothe  stated in 
his opinion before the  Court  of Justice:  "it is good  judicial technique 
to apply unwritten law only in cases  of ohscurity,  insufficiency or gaps 
in the written law"  (22).  It  appears  prudent  to add:  subject  to  jus 
cogens. 
Although the  Court  of Justice of the European  Communities  frequently 
calls in the general principlies of law,  which  have  helped to  give its 
case-law its admittedly progressive and  dynamic  character and the  study 
of which is outside the scope  of this  paper,  the  Court  of Human  Rights 
has  so  far made  less use in its decisions  of that  technique of legal 
evolution.  I  will nevertheless  give  a  few  examples  of its recourse to 
that  principle.  In the  Golder  case,  the  Court  of Human  Rights  referred 
both to the general principle of law  "which forbids the denial of 
justice",  which it described as  a  principle of international  law,  and to 
the "principle whereby  a  civil claim must  be  capable of being submitted 
to  a  judge",  which  "ranks  as  one  of the universally  'recognizedv 
fundamental  principles of law"  (23). -62-
In the Handyside  case the  Court  of Human  Rights  invoked the 
general principle "common  to the  Contracting states,  whereunder  i terns 
whose  use has  been lawfully adjudged illicit and dangerous to the 
general interests are forfeited with a  view to destruction"  (24). 
Finally,  as  has  already been stated,  the  Court  refers in several 
judgments to the general principle of proportionality (25).  Let  me 
also refer to the  De  Wilde,  Ooms  and  Versyp  case  (vagrancy),  in which 
the  Court  refers  on three occasions to the general principles of 
international law.  On  the first  occasion it states that the rule of 
exhaustion of domestic  remedies is also  one  of the generally recognized 
principles of international law,  to which Article 26  makes  specific 
reference  (26).  It then states that  "there is nothing to  prevent 
states  from  waiving the benefit  of the rule of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies  ••••  There exists on that  subject  a  long-established 
international practice from  which the  Convention has definitely not 
departed as it refers,  in Article 26,  to  'the generally recognized rules 
of international  law9 "  (27).  Finally, it states that  "under 
international law,  to which Article 26  makes  express reference the rule 
of exhaustion of domestic  remedies  demands  the use  only of such remedies 
as  are available to the persons  concerned and are sufficient,  that is 
to  say,  capable of providing redress  for their complaints  ••••  It is 
also recognized that it is for the  government  which raises the contention 
to indicate the remedies  which,  in its view,  were  available to the 
persons  concerned and which  ought  to have  been used by  them until they 
had been exhausted"  (28). 
It appears that the  case-law of the European  Court  of Human  Rights 
is gradually going further than the case-law of the  Court  of Justice in 
Luxembourg in its application and interpretation of a  Convention which, 
like the Treaty establishing the European Economic  Community,  contains 
a  large number  of rules which are formulated very widely and which 
frequently call in concepts  which are themselves  not  very clear and  which 
leave a  wide  area of discretion to the  Court  in looking to general 
principles of law. -63-
However,  when  comparing the case-law of the two  Courts,  I  shall 
not  lose sight  of the  fact that the range of the general principles of 
Community  law does  not  coincide with that  of the general principles of 
law to which the  Court  in Strasbourg looks  or might  look.  In fact, 
although the general rules of international law form  part  of the  law 
applied by the  Court  implementing the  Convention,  the  same  does  not  apply 
to the general principles of  Community  law,  which are generally specific 
in nature,  and it cannot  apply to the general principles common  to the 
Member  States of the European  Communities,  since that  body today numbers 
nine  States,  whilst  nineteen States have  signed the  Convention or have 
adhered thereto. 
C  Observations  on the methods  of interpretation of  Community  law and of the 
European  Convention on Human  Rights 
(i)  The  works  and studies which have  dealt  with the methods  of 
interpretation of the  Court  of Justice of the European  Communities  are 
many  and there can be  no  question here of making even a  summary  of them. 
The  lawyer who  wishes  to have  an overall view of their trends  and 
original features  has the inestimable privilege of being able to consult 
Mr  President  Kutscher  1 s  study of the subject  entitled "Methods of inter-
pretation as  seen by a  judge at the  Court  of Justice"  (29).  The  author 
has  performed the extraordinary task of outlining,  in 50  pages,  the main 
features  of the subtle and delicate area which makes  up the  body of the 
methods  of interpretation applied by the  Court,  of synthesising them,  of 
deriving the principles  from  them  and of placing those principles in the 
context  of the  case-law of the  Court,  without  losing any precision in the 
analysis. 
The  expression "the  body of the methods  of interpretation used by 
the  Court",  employed  by the author,  will perhaps  be  found  surprising.  It 
is,  nevertheless,  correct.  Even  when it remains within the context  of 
Article 31  of the  Vienna  Convention,  the  Court  of Justice of the European 
Communities  has various methods  of interpretation to hand  (30).  When 
dealing with questions  of  Community  law it puts the accent  to  a  greater 
or lesser degree  on•one  or other of the elements which that article of 
the  Convention lists to guide it in its interpretation of the Treaty. -64-
Thus,  the  Court  does  not  disregard,  as the case may  be,  the 
grammatical interpretation (31),  or the interpretation based on the 
usual meaning of the words  (32),  or the  context  in which the words  to 
be  interpreted appear  (33),  but it will pay greater attention to the 
object  and the aim  of the Treaty since therein lies the  special nature 
of  Community  law.  It is,  furthermore,  to be  observed that it holds 
aloof from  the literal interpretation and the historical interpretation. 
In this paper  I  shall merely make  certain observations  on the method 
of interpretation which  looks at  the aim  of the  law,  on the evolutive 
method and on the useful  effect method,  three subjects which  appear to 
be  of interest to both  Courts. 
(ii)  The  desire of the contracting states to create a  Community 
leading to economic  and social integration as well as to  gradual  legal 
integration is to  be  seen not  only in the  objectives assigned to the 
institutions by the Treaty but  also in the institutional system in the 
Community.  Thus,  the  Court  of Justice has  expressly referred on several 
occasions to its duty to interpret the provisions  of the Treaty and the 
measures  adopted by the institutions in the  light  of their "objectives" 
(34)  or of their "purposes"  (35).  The  principles which  guide the  Court 
of Justice in its interpretation are  essentiall~.r intended to satisfy the 
desire to give  Community  law an independent  existence according to the 
objectives  of integration. 
The  judgments in Van  Gend  en Laos  (36)  and  Costa v  Enel  (37), 
referred to  as  "leading cases" in Community  law,  are too  well  known  to 
call for any restatement  showing where  and  how  they exemplify the special 
nature of  Community  law.  The  interpretation which  looks  at  the aim  of 
the  law,  or teleological interpretation,  that is,  the  one  which  looks  at 
the object  and  aims  (38)  of treaties or of the terms  thereof,  is chiefly 
applied in treaties of a  legislative nature and,  even more,  in treaties 
establishing an international organization.  It is particularly important 
as  regards the  Treaties establishing the European  Communities,  which are 
intended to bring about  gradual  legislative and institutional integration 
and are a  fundamental  element  of the  special nature of  Community  law.  I 
would  like to refer to  only two  of the most  authoritative observations to 
which that method has  given rise:  the first  emanates  from  Judge  Pescatore, -65-
who  writes that  "the  Communi ties are entirely based  on the  concept  of 
objectives to  be  attained"  (39);  the  second is by  Judge  Monaco,  who, 
referring to the  dynamic  interpretation of the  EEC  Treaty,  writes that 
the  Court  of Justice makes  a  teleological reconstruction of the meanings 
of the rule  (40).  We  must  also  not  lose sight  of the  fact  that,  in the 
interpretation of the  Treaty and of the measures  adopted by the institutions, 
the special nature  of  Community  law prevents the  Court  of Justice  from 
applying the rule of international  law according to which  "limitations 
on the  sovereignty of the contracting states are in case of doubt  to be 
interpreted narrowly"  (41).  The  treaties establishing the  Communities 
are treaties of integration under which the  Contracting Parties,  adopting 
pTogressive  aims,  have  agreed to the  pooling of state powers  and  common 
interests. 
(iii)  The  Court  in strasbourg also uses  methods  of interpretation 
which  look at the object  and  aim  of the  Convention  (42).  Its case-law, 
however,  has  a  less  "dynamic" quality than that  of the  case-law of the 
Court  of Justice in Luxembourg.  Moreover,  as  has  been said,  the objectives 
of the Treaty of Rome  and those  of the  Convention are quite  different: 
the  former  seeks to bring about  gradual legislative integration - both 
economic  and social -as well  as integration of institutions by legislative 
means,  whilst the latter aims  at  protecting human  rights and  fundamental 
freedoms.  It must  not,  however,  be  forgotten that  the  acknowledged aim 
of the  Convention,  the initiative for which  was  taken by the  Council  of 
Europe,  as  described in the  Preamble to the  statute of that  body,  is not 
only the  "maintenance"  but  also the  "further realization" of human  rights 
and  fundamental  freedoms. 
The  subject  of human  rights is not  static.  It is essentially 
dynamic  in nature  and the  Contracting  states have  been careful to  say so 
and to  recommend that attention be  paid to this fact  (43).  It is all 
the more  irreconcilable with immobility in that  many  of its terms  refer 
to  extremely wide  and  sometimes  indefinite non-legal  concepts  which  increase 
the role played by  case-law and,  therefore,  of judge-made  law,  which is 
chiefly to be  found in internal constitutional  law and in the  law of 
international organizations. 
Community  law. 
In that  way  there is an affinity with -66-
As  regards the interpretation of Community  law Mr  President 
Kutscher writes  "the rule must  be understood in conne.xion with the 
economic  and social situation in which it is to take effect"  (44).  As 
regards the  Convention the  same  may  be said of the national and social 
context  which  form  the background to the situations with which the  Court 
in strasbourg has to deal. 
(iv)  The  interpretation which  looks at the aim  of the  law is 
directly linked to an evolutive interpretation.  That  is no  doubt  why 
Mr  President  Kutscher  does  not  include the evolutive interpretation among 
the  "autonomous" methods  of interpretation with which he deals  (45),  even 
though it is mainly to be  found in the  judicial and academic interpretation 
of Community  law (46). 
In a  paper dealing with the evolution of the rights  contained in 
the European  Convention on  Human  Rights  (47),  Judge  ~rensen writes, 
logically,  that it emerges  from  the text itself of Article 31  of the  Vienna 
Convention "that the ordinary meaning of a  term at the time  when  the 
Treaty was  concluded does  not  necessarily prevail over the modified or 
developed meaning which the  same  term may  have  acquired between that time 
and the time when it must  be applied"  (48).  From  the point  of view of 
an analysis of Article 31  of the Vienna  Convention that is an important 
assertion.  The  social context  from  which both an international agreement 
and internal law draw their inspiration and  justification is alive and 
reacts directly on the legislative system,  in particular,  on the  system 
of fundamental  rights.  To  a  large extent  the  aim  and  objectives of 
the  Convention are  concepts  which take  shape gradually,  that is to  say, 
they are evolutive (49).  That  view is reconcilable with the rules for 
the interpretation of Article 31  of the  Vienna  Convention,  which  does  not 
require the elements listed in the first  paragraph thereof to  be  in any 
way  immutable.  As  Judge  ~rensen writes,  the interpretation of the 
provisions of the  Convention is capable of introducing "an element  of 
dynamism  and of gradual evolution,  following the tempo  of the general 
evolution of society •••  on the  basis of the generally accepted and 
acknowledged legal and  judicial methods"  (50). -67-
(v)  The  rule of interpretation known  as the useful effect rule 
also  has  clear links with the method of interpretation which  looks at 
the aim  of the  law.  It is not  limited to the interpretation of either 
Community  law or of the  Convention.  It is one  of the rules which are 
common  to the interpretation of international undertakings.  It is 
often applied in international law and raises no  special problems as 
regards the interpretation of the  Convention. 
The  first  requirement  of that rule  concerns the preference to  be 
given to the interpretation of a  legislative provision which  gives a 
meaning to that  provision rather than to an interpretation which has  no 
meaning.  The  International  Court  of Justice has referred to the rule on 
several occasions,  in particular in the  Corfu  Channel  case,  when it 
stated that it would  be  "incompatible with the generally accepted rules 
of interpretation to admit  that  a  provision •••  occurring in a  special 
agreement  should be  devoid of purport  or effect"  (51). 
The  Court  of Justice of the European  Communi ties,  which  has  on 
several occasions  applied the useful effect rule,  is of more  immediate 
concern to us. 
In  Community  law7  as in international  law,  the useful effect  rule 
is applied in varying degrees.  The  Fedechar  judgment  is evidence of 
that.  In that  judgment  the  Court  of Justice refers to the rule of 
interpretation "according to which the rules laid down  by an international 
treaty or a  law presuppose the other rules without  which that treaty or 
law would  have  no  meaning or could not  reasonably and usefully be  applied" 
(52).  Similar terms  are to  be  found in its judgments in Government  of 
the Italian Republic v  High  Authority  (53)  and  Government  of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands v  High  Authority  (54) 7  both of which were  given on 
15  July 1960. 
In the past,  the  Court  of Justice has  applied the rule without 
referring expressly to the term "useful effect",  by looking sometimes to 
considerations which  gave  a  somewhat  subjective air to its judgments. 
Thus,  in the Algera  judgment  of 12  July 1957,  the  Court  states that the -68-
applicants'  interpretation "would lead to  an absurd result"  (55)  and 
in the  storck judgment  of 4  February 1959,  it states that  "that 
interpretation alone lthe interpretation to which the  Court's  reasoning 
lead~ avoids the unsatisfactory situation described above"  (56). 
Moreover,  on several occasions the  Court  of Justice countered 
the methods  of interpretation which the parties have  put  forward with 
the need to prevent  the provision subject to  interpretation from  losing 
its "useful effect".  This  was  done,  in particular,  in two  relatively 
recent  cases,  Reyners  (57)  and  Van  Binsbergen  (58),  in which the  Court 
was  required to interpret Articles  55  and  59  of the  Treaty respectively. 
It was  done  also in the  Van  Duyn  judgment  of 4  December  1974,  in which 
the  Court  stated that  "the useful effect  of such an act  would  be  weakened 
if individuals were  prevented from relying on it before their national 
courts"  (59).  In the latter case the  Court  took a  step further:  it 
stated that  the useful  effect  required of the interpretation does  not 
solely consist  in not  "weakening" the  scope  of the  directive;  it brings 
about  the necessary "efficacity" or  "effectiveness" of the rule laid 
down  in the measure. 
In the  Community  system the useful effect  rule assumes  proportions 
different in scope  and  importance  from  those in international law.  It 
goes  beyond a  rule of interpretation and is raised to the  level of a 
general principle of  Community  law,  associated with the  substance  of the 
law.  The  principle is assessed and applied by the  Court  of Justice  by 
reference to criteria based on the  objectives of the  Treaty,  which 
confers  upon it the necessary objectivity.  The  interpretation accepted 
must  be the  best  adapted to the  achievement  of those objectives,  which, 
by a  logical sequence,  connocts the useful effect  rule to the teleological 
method of interpretation and thus  justifies the reference to the useful 
effect  rule in this paper. 
The  Court  of Human  Rights  has  scarcely ever referred expressly to 
useful effect  rule,  except  in the  Eblgian language  case  (60),  in which it 
was  required to interpret the phrase "the right to education"  (61).  It -69-
did so  by stating that in order for that right  "to be effective,  it 
is •••  necessary that  •••  the individual who  is the beneficiary should 
have  the possibility of drawing profit  from  the education received, 
that is to  say,  the right to obtain,  in conformity with the rules in 
force in each  state  ••• ,  official recognition of the  studies which he 
has  completed".  That  was  indeed an application of the useful effect 
rule  pure  and  simple. 
It would  be  difficult to  draw a  systematic distinction between 
the useful effect  rule and the rule that  Community  legislation must  be 
effective,  which may  be  regarded as  a  refinement  of the  former.  Apart 
from  the exceptional case in which  a  contrary intention is formally 
eApressed,  the  Court  of Justice  comes  to its decision by reference to 
a  result  which the  Treaty seeks to achieve.  The  institutional system 
of the  European  Communities  reveals the essential place in the  Community 
legal order of the machinery designed to make  the action of the 
institutions effective. 
Obviously,  the  Convention does  not  contain any provision analogous 
to Article 5 of the  EEC  Treaty,  any mandatory procedure  such as that 
provided for in Articles  169  to  171  of the Treaty or compulsory procedure 
for interpretation,  but  the  concern of the  Court  of Human  Rights  about 
effectivertess has  been clearly expressed on several occasions in its 
case-law  (62). 
(vi)  The  Court  of Justice of the European  Communities  took a 
further  step when,  in order to  justify its interpretation,  it referred 
formally to the "necessary" effect  of that interpretation in order that 
the Treaty should be  applied:  the interpretation is vital if the 
objectives of the Treaty are to  be achieved.  The  first  expression of 
that view in the  case-law appears  in the  judgment  in De  Gezamenlijke 
steenkolenmi,inen in Limburg v  High  Authority,  in which the  Court  stated 
that Article 67  of the  ECSC  Treaty "is intended to  enable the  jurisdiction 
of the  Community to impinge  on national sovereignty in cases where, 
because of the  power retained by the Member  states,  this is necessary to 
prevent  the effectiveness of the Treaty from  being considerably weakened 
and its purpose  from  being seriously compromised"  (63). -70-
The  same  reasoning appears in ~  v  ~'  in which the 
precedence of  Community  law is justified on the  ground that  "the 
executive  force  of  Community  law cannot  vary from  one  state to another 
in deference to subsequent  domestic  laws,  without  jepardizing the 
attainment  of the objectives of the Treaty  ••• "  (64). 
The  celebrated judgment  of 31  March  1971,  given in Commission of 
the  European  Communi ties v  Council of the European  Communi ties,  known 
under the initials AETR,  appears to mark the final stage in the 
development  of that  case-law. 
following manner: 
The  idea is expressed therein in the 
"Although it is true that  Articles 74  and 75  do  not  expressly 
confer on the  Community  authority to enter into international 
agreements,  nevertheless the  bringing into force  •••  of 
Regulation No.  543/69  of the  Council  necessarily vested 
in the  Community  power to  enter into any agreements  with third 
countries relating to the subject-matter governed by that 
regula  t i on •  • ••  IJ:•hese  Community  powers  exclude the possibility 
of concurrent  powers  on the part  of Member  states,  since any 
steps taken outside the  framework  of the  Community  institutions 
would  be  incompatible with the unity of the  Common  Market  and 
the uniform application of Community  law".  (65) 
That  is a  decisive stage in the development  of the methods  of 
interpretation of the  Court  of Justice,  which had been prepared by 
several earlier judgments.  It goes  beyond the usual rules of interpretation 
of international  law and is justified by the principle of the  evolutive 
and progressive interpretation of an incomplete  Treaty,  every provision 
of which is a  reminder that it is intended to lead to  integration.  I 
cannot  deny myself the pleasure of quoting here the  observations of 
Mr  Boulouis  and Mr  Chevallier on that  subject.  They write:  "Although 
the treaties fixed certain objectives and although,  for a  certain period, 
it appeared reasonable to interpret their provisions  on the  basis of those 
objectives,  which were  regarded as  aims  to  be  achieved,  that  view could 
not  be applied indefinitely.  That  premise,  which was  deduced  from  the 
provisions of the treaties by the method which  looks  at  the  aim  of the 
law and the useful effect  principle,  was  to  form  the  starting point  of a 
process of reasoning which would  end in producing the required effect" 
(66). -71-
The  Court  of Human  Rights  has  not  taken the interpretation 
dictated by its effectiveness to the extreme required by the special 
character of the  objectives of  Community  law regarding integration. 
It has  remained more  closely associated with international  law  and its 
methods  of interpretation and has  allowed itself to  be  guided by the 
rule of the useful effect  of the provision interpreted,  sometimes  known 
as the "rule of the effectiveness of the treaty"  (67),  as  accepted in 
international law,  but  will not  go  beyond,  rectify or supplement  a 
treaty by means  of the process  of interpretation (68).  As  I  have  said 
( 69) ,  it only referred to that rule once,  namely when it stated that 
the right to education "would  be meaningless if it did not  imply in 
favour  of its beneficiaries the right to  be  educated in the national 
language  or in one  of the national  languages,  as the  case may  be". 
However,  the  Court  of Human  Rights  has  frequently referred by implication 
to the useful effect rule.  Thus,  in the  Golder  case,  concerning 
procedural guarantees in a  pending lawsuit,  the  Court  said,  in 
relation to the right  of access to a  court,  "The  fair,  public and 
expeditious  characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no  value at 
all if there are  no  judicial proceedings"  (70). 
(vii)  In principle,  "disputes to which the  Community  is a  party 
shall not  on that ground be  excluded from  the  jurisdiction of the  courts 
or tribunals of the Member  States"  (71).  That  rule on jurisdiction may 
give rise to divergencies in the interpretation of  Community  law.  The 
reference to the  Court  of Justice of a  question for  a  preliminary ruling 
(72)  and the action against  States  for failure to fulfil their obligations 
(73)  enable the  Court,  which  "shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of this Treaty the  law is observed"  (74),  to  preserve 
the unity of Community  law,  in particular as  regards the  determination 
of the rights and obligations of the Member  States and of their nationals. 
The  safeguarding of that unity,  which  must  be  assessed from  the point  of 
view of Community  law and  not  from  the point  of view of national  law,  is 
one  of the  fundamental  principles of the  law of the  European  Communities. -72-
Of  course,  as  regards the  states and their courts,  the case-law 
of the  Court  in strasbourg has  a  regulatory and unifying effect  on the 
interpretation of the  Convention on  Human  Rights.  However,  the  Court 
of Human  Rights  does  not  consider that the  jurisdiction conferred upon 
it by Article 48  of the  Convention obliges it to  impose  legal uniformity 
by requiring each  State to  behave  in the  same  way  as  regards  respect 
for the rights guaranteed by the  Convention.  On  that  point  there is 
an appreciable difference between the two  systems.  In the  Belgian 
language  case,  the  Court  stated that  respect  for the  Convention  does 
not  allow it to  "disregard those  legal and factual  features  which 
characterize the life of the  society in the  state which,  as the 
Contracting Party,  has to answer  for the measure  in dispute".  In doing 
so,  the  Court  cannot  "assume the role of the  competent  national 
authorities,  for it would thereby lose sight  of the  subsidiary nature 
of the international machinery of collective enforcement  established by 
the  Convention"  (75).  It made  the  same  statement  again in similar terms 
in the  Handyside  case,  when it added that  "The  Convention leaves to  each 
Contracting state,  in the first  place,  the task of securing the rights 
and  freedoms  which it enshrines.  The  institutions created by it make 
their own  contribution to this task but  they become  involved only 
through contentious  proceedings  and once all domestic  remedies  have  been 
exhausted"  (76). 
The  Court  and the  Commission of Hwnan  Rights  allow the  Contracting 
States an area of discretion in the application of the  Convention on the 
basis of their national  laws.  The  Court  of Human  Rights  has  been 
careful to  state this on several occasions  (77). 
(viii)  Since that  distinction is capable of giving rise to  or of 
introducing doubts  into the area of human  rights,  does it not  militate 
in favour  of the adoption of an optional  procedure  by which the national 
courts may  refer questions  on the interpretation of the  Convention and 
on certain of its additional protocols to the  Court  of Human  Rights  for  a 
preliminary ruling?  Many  variants of the  system established by Article 
177  of the Treaty of Rome,  which has  contributed under particularly 
favourable  conditions to the harmony  and  development  of  Community  law, 
might  be  considered.  Among  all those variants,  the  advisory opinion, 
which would reconcile  procedures  for which there are useful  precedents 
both in the rules laid down  in conventions  and in practice,  is about  as 
far as it would  be  possible to  go  (78). -73-
(ix)  On  several occasions  since  1969  (79)  the  Court  of Justice 
has  confirmed that it protects fundamental  rights  (80).  Its confirmation 
was  accompanied by a  two-fold reservation.  The  first reservation was 
immediately apparent  since it concerned the legal  justification for that 
confirmation,  which is that  fundamental  rights are "included among  the 
general principles of  Community  law".  The  second may  be inferred from 
a  certain ambiguity which was  apparently intentional:  the rights in 
question are not  necessarily general  fundamental  rights:  but  are those 
"protected by the  Court".  The  protection of those rights will be 
ensured "within the  framework of the structure and  objectives of the 
Community". 
From  a  literal point  of view,  both the wide  interpretation and 
the interpretation which is limited to  specific fundamental  rights are 
acceptable but it is self-evident that if one  were  to adopt  the latter 
interpretation there is not  a  national or  Community  judge  who  would today 
be  in a  position to fix a  clear limit to the area "protected" by the 
Court  of Justice. 
The  concept  of the general principles of law,  applied to  fundamental 
rights,  offers an advantage  which  I  find difficult to dispute:  it is an 
extremely flexible  concept  and one  which may  gradually be broadened.  It 
leaves the court the power to  decide  on the rights which are "fundamental" 
in a  democratic  society.  The  general principles of law in that area are 
deduced  from  the written and unwritten constitutional laws  common  to the 
Member  states and detached from  their national contexts.  In the latest 
development  which has  taken place in the  case-law of the  Court  of Justice 
they are also  deduced from  the international instruments  on the protection 
of human  rights to which the Member  states are signatories  (81).  The 
Court  has  advanced further in that  area by referring directly to the 
European  Convention on  Human  Rights.  In the Rutili  judgment,  which 
concerned the  justification for  limits placed "on grounds  of public policy" 
on the  free movement  of workers,  the  Court  referred expressly to the 
limits laid down  by the  European  Convention for the  Protection of Human 
Rights  and made  the point  that it had been ratified by all the Member 
states  (82).  As  explained in the  first  part  of this  paper,  the  Court -74-
of Justice assimilates the restrictions necessitated by public policy 
to the limitations provided for by the  Convention in the second 
paragraphs  of Articles 8,  9,  10  and 11,  which it regards  as  "a specific 
manifestation of the more  general principle"  (83). 
It  can be  seen that  a  gradual  convergence is taking place in the 
case-law of the two  Courts  as  regards  both the protection of fundamental 
rights and the "necessary" limitations or restrictions in a  democratic 
society in which human  rights are bound up with "the duties and 
responsibilities" which a  man  assumes  in society (84).  The  concept  of 
duties and responsibilities,  expressly referred to in Article  10  (2)  of 
the  Convention,  underlies the expressions  "protection of ••• morals" and 
"protection of the rights and  freedoms  of others" to  be  found in the 
second paragraphs of Articles 8,  9,  10  and  11  of the  Convention. 
It is for the  Court  of Justice to consider both whether it ensures 
protection of human  rights and also the restrictions which may  be  placed 
thereon,  not  only in the light  of the text  of the  Treaty and the general 
principles of law but  also  by reference to undertakings  governed by 
international  law which are binding on the Member  states and which the 
Community is obliged to respect  (85).  It is,  clearly,  also  for it to 
decide  on the significance of the declaration made  on 5 April  1977  by 
the  Assembly,  the  Council  and the  Commission  of the European  Communities 
(86). (l) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(ll) 
(12) 
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In order to  simplify matters  in the context  of the Community  legal 
order  only the Treaty establishing the European Economic  Community 
in which the problems  in question are most  clearly raised will  be 
considered  and  as regards  the Court  in Strasbourg reference will 
only be made  to  the Convention  leaving aside for the moment  the 
additional protocols. 
Cf.  Article ll of the Convention which guarantees  everyone "the right 
to  form  and  join trade unions for the protection of his interests." 
Cf.  Eur.  Court  H.R.  National Union  of Belgian Police case,  judgment 
of  27  October  1975,  Series A,  Vol.  19,  pp.  17-18,  paras.3d-39  and p.20, 
para.  45;  Swedish  ~'ngine Drivers'  Union  case,  judgment  of  6 February 
1976,  Series A,  Vol.  20,  pp.  14-17,  paras.  39-40  and  45;  Schmidt  and 
Dahlstrom case,  judgment  of  6 February  1976,  Series A,  Vol.  21,  p.l6, 
para.  36  and p.l7,para.  39. 
Case  130/75,  judgment  of  27  October 1976, ~  v  Council  Ll97~ ECR 
1589  et  seq.  CL  in particular paragraph 16  of the Decision at p.l599· 
It is expressly provided with regard to  the movement  of workers  (EEC 
Treaty,  Art.  48  (2)),  provision of  services  (EEC  Treaty,  Art.  65)  and 
the movement  of capital  (EEC  Treaty,  Art.  67). 
Case  36/74,  jud~ent of  12  December  1974,  Walrave  v  Union  Cycliste 
Internationale  Ll97~ ECR  1405  et  seq. 
"The  rules  (in the Treaty)  regarding equality of treatment  forbid not 
only overt  discrimination by  reason of nationality but  also  all covert 
forms  of discrimination which,  by  the  application of other criteria of 
differentiation,  lead in fact  to the  same  result.  This  interpretation 
•••  is necessary to  ensure the  effective working of one  of the 
fundamental  principles of the Community",  (Case  1~2/73,  judgment  of 
12  February  1974,  Sotgiu  v  Deutsche Bundespost,  Ll97i? ECR  153  et  seq.). 
Case  55/76,  judgment  of  22  Janu~  1976,  Balkan Import-Export  v 
Hauptzollamt Berlin Packhof Ll97~ ECR  19  et  seq. 
Series A,  Vol.  6,  p.34 in fine. 
Series A,  Vol.  6.,  supra p.34 
Series A,  Vol.  19,  supra,  p.20,  para.  46. 
Series A,  Vol.  22,  judgment  of 8  June  1976,  p.3l,  para.  72. 
Case  41/74,  judgment  of  4  December  1974,  Van  Dgyn  v  Home  Office Ll97i7 
ECR  1337  et  seq., in particular p.l350. - 76-
(13)  Cf.  W.J.  Ganshof  van der Meersch:  La Convention  europeenne des droits 
de  l'homme  a-t-elle,  dans  le  cadre  du droit  interne,  une valeur d'ordre 
public?  in Les droits de  l'homme  en droit  interne  et  droit  international, 
pp.l55-251,  pub.  Presses universitaires de Bruxelles,  1968. 
(14)  Convention:  Art.  8  (2),  Art.  9  (2),  Art.  10  (2)  and  Art.  ll (2). 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
Case 8/55,  judgment  of 16 July 1956,  Federation Charbonniere  de Belgigue 
v  High Authority of the ECSC,  Rec.  1955 - 1956,  p.l99  et  seq., in 
particular p.304.  See  also  Case  8/56,  judgment  of 10  December  1957, 
A.L.M.A.  v  Hi  h  Authorit  of the ECSC,  Rec.  195~ p.l79 et  seq.,  in 
particular p.l92;  Case  25  70,  judgment  of  7  December  1970,  Einfuhr-
und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide  v  Koster L131Q7  ECR  1161  et  seq.  in 
particular p.ll74;  Joined Cases  63  to  69/72,  judgment  of 13 November 
1973,  Werhahn  v  Council Ll97i7 ECR  1229  et  seq.,  in particular pp. 
1250-1;  Case  33/74,  judgment  of  3  December  197~  Van  Binsbergen v 
Bedri.jfsvereniging Metaalni.jverheid [i97i} ECR  1299  et  seq., in 
particular pp.l309-l310.  In his opinion in Case  ll/70,  Internationale 
Handels  esellschaft  v  Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide  (judgment 
of 17  December  1970,  1970  ECR  1125 at p.  1147  Mr  Advocate 
General  Dutheillet  de  Lamothe  defined the principle  of proportionality 
as "the fundamental  right  • • •  that the individual  should not  have  his 
freedom  of action limited beyond the degree necessary for the general 
interest".  In support  of that principle he  referred to Article  40 
of the EEC  Treaty  from  which it follows  that the  common  organization 
of the  agricultural markets mcy  include  only "those measures required 
to attain the objectives set  out  in Article  39"· 
Case  15/57,  judgment  of  12  June  1958,  Compagnie  des Hauts Fourneaux de 
Chasse  v  High Authority of the  ECSC  Rec.  1958,  p.l6l et  seq.,  in 
particular p.190. 
Case  5/73,  judgment  of  24  October  1973,  Balkan-Import-Export  v 
Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof Ll97i7 ECR  1091  et  seq.  and  Case 9L75, 
judgment  of  24  October  1973,  Schluter v  Hauptzollamt  Lorrach Ll97i7 
ECR  1135  et  seq. 
Series A,  Vol.  6,  p.34,  para.  10;  See  also National  Union  of Belgian 
Police case,  Series A,  Vol.  19,  supra,  p.20,  para.  46;  Schmidt  and  Dahlstrom 
case,  judgment  of  6 February  1976,  Series A,  Vol.  21,  p.l8,  para.  42;  the 
Case  of Engel  and  others,  Series A,  Vol.  22,  supra,  p.3l,  para.  72. 
Han~yside case,  Series A,  Vol.  24,  p.23,  para.  49. 
Lawless  case,  judgment  of  l  July 1961,  Series A,  Vol.  3,  PP-57-59, 
paras.  36  to  38. 
Vienna Convention,  Article  31. - 77  -
(22) 
(23)  Series A,  Vol.  18,  supra,  p.17,  para.  35. 
(24)  Series A,  Vol.  24,  supra,  p.30,  para.  63. 
(25)  ~  supra the references to the  following cases:  Case  relating to 
certain aspects of the  laws  on  the use  of  languages  in  ed~cation in 
Belgium;  National Union  of Belgian Police;  Swedish Engine  Drivers' 
~;  Schmidt  and  Dahlstrom;  Engel  and  others;  Hand,yside;  Lawless. 
(26)  Series A,  Vol ••  12,  p.29,  para.  50. 
(27)  Series A,  p.31,  para.  55· 
(28)  Series A,  p.33,  para.  60. 
(29)  Publication of the Court  of Justice of the European Communities  on 
the  occasion of the Judicial  and  Academic  Conference,  27-28 September 
1976  (Luxembourg 1977).  ~also:  L'Europe des Juges,R.  Lecourt, 
then  President  of the  Court  of Justice (Brussels,  1976)  in particular 
pp.234 to  247,  264,  267  to  271  and  272;  W.J.  Ganshof  van der Meersch, 
L'ordre  "uridi  e  des  Communautes  euro  eennes  et  le droit  international", 
a  course  given at  the Academy  for International Law  The  Hague,  1975  • 
( 30)  These  various methods  of interpret  at ions  are discussed at pp.  15  to 
42  in the report  by Kutscher,  2£.•  .£.ll·  with references to the  case-law 
of the Court  of Justice. 
(31)  The  Court  of Human  Rights  for its part  often has recourse to  grammatical 
interpretation,  that is to  say  interpretation on the basis of the 
structure of the provision to be  interpreted.  It  sometimes  expressly 
says  so.  ~: Lawless  case,  judgment  of  1  July  1961,  Series A,  Vol. 
3,  p.52,  para.  14;  Wemhoff  case,  judgment  of  27  June  1968,  Series A, 
Vol.  7,  p.21,  para.  4;  Golder  case,  Series A,  supra,  pp.l4  and  15,  para. 
32;  Hand,yside  case,  Series A,  Vol.  24,  supra,  p.29,  para.  62. 
(32)  The  Court  of Human  Rights clearly also has regard to the ordinary meaning 
of words.  Vide  in particular:  Lawless  case,  Series A,  Vol.  3,  supra, 
pp.52  and  5~aras. 14  and  28;  Case relating to certain aspects  of the 
laws  on the use  of  languages  in education in Belgium,  Series A,  Vol.  6, 
supra,  pp. 32  and  35,  paras.  6 and  11. 
(33)  The  judgments where  the Court  in Strasbourg refers to the context  are 
also  numerous.  Here  again this is one  of its standard methods.  ~ 
in particular De  Wilde,  Ooms  and  Versyp (vagrancy),  judgment  of  l()  June lgTl, Series 
A,  Vol.  12,  pp.  41  to  42,  para.  78;  Golder,  Series A,  Vol.  lb,  supra, 
pp.  14,  17  and  18,  paras.  31,  34  and  36;  Engel  and  others,  judgment  of 
8  June  1976,  Series A,  Vol.  22,  p.41,  para.  98;  Kjeldsen,  Busk Madsen 
and  Pedersen,  Series A,  Vol.  23,  pp.24  and  25,  paras.  50  and  52. ( 34) 
(35) 
(36) 
( 37) 
(38) 
( 39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
- 78  -
Case  25/70,  judgment,  of  17  December  1970,  Einfuhr- und  Vorratsst elle 
Getreide  v  Koster ~97Q7 ECR  1161  at  p.ll74;  Case  61/72,  judgment  of 
13 March  1973,  Maatschappij  PPW  v  Hoofdproduktschap  voor  Akkerbouw-
produkten Ll97j/ ECR  301,  et  seq.  in particular p.310.  In this case 
where  the  arguments  centred around the various  language versions  of  one 
provision the Court  of Justice decided that  "the meaning of the provisions 
in question must  be  determined with respect to their objective".  Vide 
also  Case  6/7  4,  judgment  of  21  November  197 4,  Mouli.jn  v  Commission~7Y 
ECR  1287  et  seq.  in particular p.1293. 
Case  26/62,  judgment  of  5 February  1963,  Van  Gend  en Laos  v  Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen Ll96j7 ECR  l  et  seq.  in particular p.l2; 
~also  inter alia:  Case  14/68,  judgment  of 13  Februar7 1969,  Wilhelm 
v  Bundeskartellamt Ll9627 ECR  1,  at pp.l3-l4;  Case  1~0/7~,  judgment  of 
30  October  1974,  Officiervan Justitie v  Van  Haaster  Ll97~ ECR  1123  et 
seq.  in particular pp.  1132-1133. 
Case  26/62,  Van  Gend  en  Laos  v  Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 
Ll96}7  ECR  l  et  seq. 
Case  6/64,  judgment  of 15  July  1964,  Costa v  ENEL  L196i7 ECR  585  et  seq. 
The  object  is "the direct  and  immediate  effect  of the measure";  the 
aim  or the purposes  are "the result  of the legal  effect produced  by 
the measure"  which  is to be  intepreted.  Cf.  C.  Rousseau,  Droit  International 
Public  (Paris 1970)  I,  no.  241,  p.272. 
Les  objectifs de  la Corr@unaute  Europeenne  comme  principes d'interpretation 
dans la  ·uris rudence  de la Cour  de Justice in Miscellanea G·anshof  van der 
Meersch,  II  Brussels-Paris,  1972  ,  p.325  et  seq.  in particular p.327. 
Communautes  Europeennes  in Melanges 
in particular p.225. 
la Cour  de  Justice des 
Paris,  1964  p.217  et  seq, 
Kutscher,  op.  cit, p.31.  Cf.also R.  Bernhardt 1  Die Auslegung 
Volkerrechtlicher Vertrage,  (Cologne,  1963)  p.l43 et  seq. 
As  to the reference to the  aim  and the object  of the  Convention vide: 
Lawless  case,  Series A,  Vol.  3,  supra,  p.42,  para.  14;  Case  rel~g  to 
certain aspects of the  laws  on the use  of  lanf?Uages  in education in Belgium, 
Series A,  Vol.  6,  sgpra,  p.32,  para.  5;  Wemhoff  case,  Series A,  Vol.  7, 
supra,  p.23,  para.  ;  Neumeister  case,  judgment  of  7  M~ 1974,  Series A, 
Vol.  17,  p.l3,  para.  30;  Golder  case,  Series A,  Vol.  18,  supra,  pp.  16, 
17  and  18,  paras.  34  and  36;  case of Engel  and  others,  Series A,  Vol.  22, 
p.34,  para.  81;  K.jeldsen,  Busk Madsen  and Pedersen case,  Series A,  Vol. 
23,  p.27,  para.  53. 
Statute of the Council  of Europe,  Article  3:  "Every Member  of the Council 
of Europe must  •••  collaborate sincerely  and  effectively in the realization 
of the  aim  of the  Council  as  specified in Chapter 1." - 79  -
(44)  Op.  cit., p.5. 
(45)  Op.  cit., p.15. 
(46)  This is not  a  reference to the  case to  case technique  of interpretation. 
Certainly this technique is applicable  in the context  of evolutive 
interpretation but  it is only  a  technique  and  a  judge mqy  have  recourse 
to it in the context  of other methods  of  interpretation,  for  example  in 
the context  of the grammatical  method  or the historical  method.  The 
evolution of the  case  law brought  about by the  evolution of the provision 
itself is here  envisaged  and not  merely the evolution of the  judge's 
conception of the provisior- which  he  is called upon  to interpret. 
(47)  Les droits inscrits en  1950  dans la Convention  europeenne des droits 
de  l'homme  ont  ils la meme  si  ification en  l  ?,  published by  the 
Council  of Europe  Strasbourg 1975  p.4. 
(48)  In support  of this view  Judge  S~rensen cites the Advisory  Opinion  of 
the International Court  of Justice in the case  on the Legal  Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence  of South Africa in Namibia  (South 
West  Africa)  notwithstanding Security Council Resolution  276  (197~ 
Order No.  1  of  26  Januar.y  1971,  I.C.J. Reports  1971,  p.  16  at  p.31.  The 
opinion is given with regard to  an  article of the United Nations 
Covenant  but  there is no  reason for thinking that the observation is to 
be  limited to that provision.  The  International Court  moreover  expressly 
states that J.g ~  of that part  of the Opinion: 
"Mindful  as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an 
instrument  in accordance with the  intentions of the parties at  the  time 
of its conclusion,  the  Court  is bound to  take  into  account  the fact  that 
the  concepts  embodied  in Article  22  of the  Covenant  - 'the  strenuous 
conditions  of the modern world'  and  'the well-being  and  development'  of 
the peoples  concerned -were not  static,  but  were  by  definition  evolutionary, 
as  also,  therefore,  was  the  concept  of the  'sacred trust' •  The  parties 
to the  Covenant  must  consequently be  deemed  to have  accepted  them  as  such. 
That  is why,  viewing the institutions of 1919,  the Court  must  take  into 
consideration the  changes which  have  occurred  in the  supervening half-
century,  and  its interpretation cannot  remain unaffected by  the  subsequent 
development  of  law,  through the Charter  of the United Nations  and  by  wqy 
of  customary  law.  Moreover,  an  international  instrument  has to be 
interpreted and  applied within the  framework  of the entire legal  system 
prevailing at  the time  of the  interpretation. 
(49)  Thus:  the right  of association,  racial equality,  freedom  of expression 
~d its limits,  the right  of ownership  and its limits,  the protection 
of  a  person's private life,  the protection of morals  and health  and, 
more  generally,  the  concepts  of the limits of fundamental  rights provided 
for  in Articles 8,  9,  10  and ll of the  Convention. 
(50)  Op.  cit., p.6. 
(51)  International Court  of Justice,  judgment  of 9  April 1949,  I.C.J. Reports 
1949,  P•4  at  p.24.  Vide  also  the  case of the German  settlers in Poland, 
Permanent  Court  of  I~national Justice reports 1923,  Series B,  No.6,  p.25; 
the Advisory Opinion  on Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service 
of the United Nations,  I.C.J. Reports  1949,  p.174 at  pp.l79-180. (52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
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Case  8/55,  judgment  of  29  November  1956,  Federation Charbonniere de 
Belgique,  supra at  p.291  et  seq. 
Case  20/59,  judgment  of  15 July  1960,  Italian Republic  v  High Authority 
of the ECSC,  Rec.,  1960  p.663,  in particular p.688. 
Case  25/59,  judgment  of 15  July 1960,  Kingdom  of the Netherlands  v  High 
Authority of the ECSC,Rec.,  1960  p.723,in particular p.758. 
Joined Cases  7/56  and  3 to 7/57,  judgment  of  12  July 1957,  Algera and 
others v  Common  Assembly  of the ECSC,  Rec.  1957,  p.8~ in particular p.ll8. 
Case  l/58,  judgment  of 4  February  1959,  Friedrich Stork  and  Co.  v  High 
Authority of the ECSC,  Rec.,  1958-1959 p.43,  in particular p.66. 
Case  2/74,  judgment  of  21  June  1974,  Reyners  v  Belgium ~97j] ECR  631, 
in particular p .655. 
Case  33/74,  judgment  of  3  December  1974,  Van  Binsbergen v  Bedrijfs-
vereniging Metaalnijverheid ~97~  ECR  1299  in particular pp.l309  and 
1310. 
Case  41/74,  judgment  of 4  December  1974,  Van  ~yn v  Home  Office  Ll97~7 
ECR  1337,  in particular pp.  1348. 
Series A,  Vol.  6,  supra. 
P.3l,  para.  4. 
De  Wilde,  Ooms  and  Versyp  case,  Series A,  Vol.  147  supra,  p.9,  para.l6; 
Ringeisen case,  judgment  of  22  June  1972,  Series A,  Vol.  15,  p.8,  para. 
21;  Neumeister  case,  judgment  of  7  M~ 1974,  Series A,  Vol.  17,  p.l4, 
para.  30;  National Union  of Belgian Police sase,  Series A,  Vol.  19, 
~'  p.l8,  para.  38;  _Swedish  Engine Drivers'  Union  case,  judgment 
of 6 Februar,y  1976,  Ser1es A,  Vol.  20,  p.l5,  para.  39;  Schmidt  and 
Dahlstrom case,  judgment  of  6 February  1976,  Series A,  Vol.  21,  p.15, 
para.  34. 
Case  30/59,  judgment  of  23  February  1961,  De  Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen 
in Limburg v  High Authority of the  ECSC,  Rec.  1961,  p.l,  in particular p.46. 
My underlining. 
Case  6/64,  Costa v  ENEL  .fj96i/ ECR  585  at  p.594. Yi,2&  alsc  Ce.se 
14/68,  Wilhelm  v  Bundeskartellamt  Ll9627  ECR  l  at  pp.  14-15;  Case 
ll/70,  Internationale Handels  esellschaft  v  Einfuhr- und  Vorratsstelle 
Getreide  1970  ECR  1125  at p.ll34;  Case  48  71,  judgment  of  13 July 
1972,  Commission  v  Italy Ll97i7 ECR  527  at  p.532. (65) 
(66) 
- 81  -
Case  22/70,  judgment  of  31  March  1971,  Commission  v  Council Ll97i7 
ECR  263  at  pp.  275  and  276.  (European Agreement  concerning the work 
of  crews  of vehicles  engaged  in international road transport). 
Grands  arrets de la Cour  de  Justice des  Communautes  euro  eennes  (Paris, 
1974  in particular p.lO  • 
(67)  Cited by  C.  Rousseau,  Droit  international public,  I  (Paris,  1970) 
No.  240,  p.272. 
(68)  South-West  Africa case,  I.C.J.  Reports  1966,  p.50,  No.  96. 
(69)  Series A,  Vol.  6,  judgment  of 23  July  1968  (Merits),  p.3l,  para.  3, 
supra. 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
Series A,  Vol.  18,  judgment  of  21  February  1975,  p.l8,  para.  35. 
Cf.  also  in the  same  case with regard to the  interpretation of Article 
8, ~·  p.20,  para.  43;  Case  on  the laws  on  the use  of languages  in 
education in Belgium,  with regard to the  interpretation of Article 14 
concerning the prohibition of discrimination;  it is well  known  that 
the  Court  and  the  Commission  consider Article 14 in conjunction with 
another article of the Convention  as Article  14 only concerns "the 
rights  and  freedoms  set  forth in this Convention";  however  the recent 
decided  cases of the  Commission  and  those  of the Court  support  the theory  of 
the  autonomy  of Article  14  (c~M.-A. Eissen,  L'autonomie de  l'article 
l  de la Convention  euro  eenne des droits de  l'homme  dans  la  ·uris rudence 
de la Commission  in Melanges Modinos  Paris,  1968  p.l22 et  seq  ;  this 
question  concerned the interpretation of Article  14 in conjunction with 
Article 8  of the Convention  and  Article  2  of the additional Protocol 
(Series A,  Vol.  6,  pp.33-34,  para.9). 
EEC  Treaty,  Art.  183. 
EEC  Treaty,  Art.  177· 
EEC  Treaty,  Art.  169  and  Art.  171. 
EEC  Treaty,  Art.  164. 
Case  on the  laws  on the use  of lan  es  in education in Bel  ium, 
judgment  of  23  July  196  ,  Series A,  Vol.  6,  pp.  34  and  35,  para.  10. 
Han&yside  case,  judgment  of 7  December  1976,  Series A,  Vol.  24,  p.22, 
para.  48. (77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
(81) 
- 82  -
Cf.  Tie  Wilde,  Ooms  and  Versyp  case  (vagrancy),  judgment  of 18  June 
1971,  Series A,  Vol.  12,  p.45,  para.  93  (derogations  from  respect 
for private  and  family  life,  home  and  correspondence,  Art.  8  (2)); 
Golder  case,  judgment  of  21  February  1975,  Series A,  Vol.  18,  p.22, 
para.  45  (the  same  provision);  case of Engel  and  others,  judgment 
of 8  June  1976,  Series A,  Vol.  22,  p.25,  para.  59  (relatin9 to the 
organization of the  system  of military discipline,  Art.  5  \1),  p.3l, 
para.  72  (inequalities of treatment  with regard to military  service, 
Art.  5(1)  in conjunction with Art.  14)  and  pp.4l-42,  para.  100 
(derogations  from  the freedom  of expression and  the freedom  to receive 
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Paper  by  Mr  Fawcett,  President  of the  Commission  of Human  Rights 
I  want  to express first  our gratitude to the European  Court  of 
Justice for inviting us to take part in this discussion,  because  I 
believe that  such discussions  can  only be  fruitful in finding ways 
of improving the effectiveness of the  Convention,  possibly without 
drastic amendments  which  we  know  can  cause  difficulties.  The 
consultation that has  taken place  on  some  matters between the 
Commission  and the  Court  of Human  Rights  has  already been both 
informal  and effective,  for  example,  on the question of the presence 
or participation of an applicant  or his representative in the proceed-
ings  of the  Court  of Human  Rights,  and in his helpful  paper Judge 
Ganshof  Van  Der  Meersch  referred to this point. 
I  take this to be  an  open discussion and  so  my  colleagues who 
are here will  certainly be  expressing their views  too  on  the various 
issues that arise.  But  I  would like to  offer  some  remarks  which  I 
hope  are  of  some  common  interest to the three bodies which are 
represented here.  I  start with certain assumptions.  My  first is that 
the present  discussion is not  directed to possible basic  changes in 
the  structure of the  Convention,  though  amendments  might  come  to be 
suggested at  some  points;  but  I  understand  from  the  two  very helpful  and 
thoughtful  interventions we  have  so  far had,  that  the  general  structure 
of the  Convention,  as it now  is,  is assumed  to be  the base  of the present 
discussion.  I  would like to  add there  that that  does  not  mean  I  do  not 
think the  Convention is in great  need  of revision,  but that is a  very 
different matter. 
My  second assumption is that the  Declaration of the  Communities 
in April,  which we  have  before us,  does not,  in the words  of Judge 
Sprensen,  make  a  formal  incorporation of the  Convention into  Community 
law. 
My  third assumption is a  very different  one.  It is that  at 
least  some  of our  countries have  entered a  period of greater social 
tension,  both political and  economic,  than was  present in the first 
ten or fifteen years  of the life of the  Convention;  and  I  think that 
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this may  impose  strains on the  Convention which  we  have  not  yet 
experienced. 
I  believe that  the effective application of the  Convention at 
present,  and  I  stress at  present,  depends  in great part  on  two  related 
factors  - publicity and  governmental  image;  and by government  here  I 
include  parliament,  the  courts,  and the  administration.  There  is 
indeed a  kind of principle that  law and practice must  conform  with the 
Convention and must  be  seen to  conform with the  Convention.  This guides 
the national responses to the  interpretations of the  Convention that  are 
put  forward  by the  competent  bodies.  If we  are  now  to try to see  how 
in the relation of the  work  of our  three institutions progress  can perhaps 
be  made,  it mey  be helpful to glance at  some  of t.he  potentialities 
and limitations of the three institutions in the  implementation of the 
Convention. 
Take  first the  Commission.  It has  of course  very wide  opportunities 
for  interpreting and applying the  Convention.  It has  now  had  over  8  000 
applications  since its work  began  and is as  familiar to you all but  a  very 
great majority of those  have  been rejected,  that is to  say,  they have  been 
declared inadmissible.  If one  compares  those statistics with the 
experience  of ombudsmen  or parliamentary commissions  or civil rights 
commissions  in the  United States - the  relation between applications in a 
more  or less free  system of application,  that is,  where  there is no  strong 
filtering process  - the  figures  are rather the  same  for  what  gets 
rejected,  let us  say,  out  of hand  and  what  is taken up  for more  thorough 
investigation.  Further,  the  fact  that  a  very large proportion of the 
applications  to the  Commission  are  declared inadmissible  does  not  mean 
that  there is no  effect  from  those  applications.  In fact  you  would  have 
to increase  the  percentage rather considerably in order to  determine  what 
applications  had  had  some  effect.  I  do  not  want  to take  any  time  on  this, 
but  there  could be  examples  given of applications  declared inadmissible 
where,  in the  process  of arriving at this conclusion,  the  government  has 
decided to make  some  change  in its administration.  So,  the  opportunities 
of the  Commission  under the  Convention are  wide. 
A second  feature  of the  Commission's  work is that its interpretation 
of the  Convention is decisive at the  stage  of admissibility.  This  means 
that the great  mass  of applications to the  Commission  do  involve  and  lead 
to interpretations of the  Convention,  of which there  are  now  many  volumes, and those  interpretations,  right  or wrong,  are  decisive  as  far  as  the 
Convention goes  because  the  applications - where  you  have  a  declaration 
of inadmissibility or where  you  have  admissibility and  settlement  - do 
not  go  beyond the  Commission. 
I  think the  limitations of the  Commission  are very clear.  It 
may  only give  an opinion;  its conclusion as to the  application of the 
Convention in an admitted case  is not  decisive, it is an opinion,  and 
if there is no  settlement  of the  case it has  no  further  competence,  the 
matter going to the  Committee  of Ministers or,  in certain cases,  to the 
Court  of Human  Rights. 
A second limitation is the  fact  that the  proceedings  of the 
Convention are  confidential.  Now,  it is quite  true that  the  decisions 
on  admissibility are  published,  but,  of course,  they are  not  easily 
available.  The  confidentiality of the  proceedings  has  of course  its 
advantages,  but it does  have  from  the  point  of view of the  publicity 
which  I  mentioned as  an  important  factor in the  implementation of the 
Convention,  a  marked  disadvantage. 
If I  may  come  now  to the  Court  of Human  Rights,  it is clear that 
its proceedings  are public,  and that its decisions are  not  only public 
but  widely publicized.  This is illustrated by the  clear impact  that 
decisions  of the European  Court  of Human  Rights  have  been having in 
recent  years.  That  is a  very important  element,  and  does  suggest  that 
it would  be  good to widen, if possible,  the  work  of the  Court  of Human 
Rights. 
A second  function it has,  of course,  is that of authoritative 
interpretation of the  Convention.  I  think it is not  disputed that 
the  authoritative interpretation of the  Convention,  as  far  as  the 
Convention organs go,  lies with the  Court  of Human  Rights.  There  are, 
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to interpret  and  apply the  Convention.  This  arises  for  a  number 
of reasons  and it has  been  a  matter  of  concern,  I  think,  to the 
Commission  and the  Court.  But  under  the  present  structure  of the 
Convention it may  be  difficult to reverse this very effectively. 
A  second limitation is that  the  decisions  of the  Court  do  not  have 
direct  effect  in internal  law and there  may  be  a  question as  to  how 
far the  Court  of Human  Rights  can make  orders.  Article  SO  as  those 
familiar  with it know  is not  an entirely easy article to interpret; 
and if we  may  look at  Article  54,  which brings  the  judgments  of the 
Court  back to ultimate  implementation by the  Committee  of Ministers, 
we  see  that there  can  be  a  limitation.  It may  be  noted that  the 
Commission is still getting applications raising this  same  issue  as 
that  which  arose  in the  Golder  Case,  decided by the  Court. 
If I  may  venture  now  to  speak of the  European  Court  of Justice, 
it seems  to me  that it has  certain important potentialities as  far  as 
our  Convention goes.  Its hearings  are,  of course,  public.  Very 
importantly its  judgments  are  effective in ihe  internal  law.  It is 
able  more  rapidly to  dispose  of cases that  come  before it than the 
Convention  organs,  and  indeed the  length of proceedings under  the 
Convention is a  matter  of great  concern to us  all.  The  Commission 
has  made  efforts,  which  I  think are  bearing some  fruit,  to  improve  its 
procedures  in this respect.  But  I  think the  rapid disposal  of  cases 
is a  very important  aspect  of the  implementation  of the  Convention  and 
that  would  seem  to  me  to lie within the  power  of the  European  Court  of 
Justice.  There  are,  of  course,  limits that  are  often mentioned  of the 
content  and  scope  of the  Rome  Treaty.  This  is described sometimes  as 
being about  economics,  but  even  a  casual  reading of the  Rome  Treaty 
would  show that  there  may  be  issues  which  do  overlap  or  raise  claims 
and issues under  the  Convention.  Judge  Sprensen  has  very persuasively 
shown  some  of the  possibilities that  lie there.  Having  looked at  these 
potentialities and  limitations  of our three institutions,  and  assuming 
that  the  present  structure  and  competences  will  be  broadly the  same,  we 
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First,  I  would  suggest  a  change  of practice,  which  concerns 
primarily the  Commission  and the  Court,  but  could touch perhaps  on 
the  work  of the  European  Court  of Justice,  and that  is to  see  whether 
it would not  be  possible to refer what  we  may  call  justiciable  cases 
more  quickly to the  Court  of Human  Rights.  The  familiar distinction 
between  justiciable  and non-justiciable,  though like  most  familiar 
distinctions it is very difficult to define,  is perhaps  helpful  here 
and  I  would  say that  issues under Articles  5  and  6  of the  Convention, 
that is to  say the  problems  of detention  and  of fair trial,  are 
essentially justiciable and,  if a  way  could be  found to  accelerate 
references  of substantial applications under  those  articles to the 
Court,  there  could be  a  great  advance  in the  implementation  of the 
Convention. 
As  a  second  suggestion  I  think it might  be  helpful to discuss 
the possibility of State  participation in proceedings  before  the  Court 
by Contracting Parties to the  Convention  which  are  interested in a 
particular case.  This  is possible  in the  European  Court  of Justice. 
As  at  least  one  of the  objects  of the  Convention must  be  the  establishment 
and  securing of  common  standards,  there  are  issues that  come  to the 
Court  of Human  Rights  in which it could be  most  helpful if the  views 
of governments  not  directly involved  could be  given to the  Court. 
The  third question which  has  been,  of course,  already considerably 
discussed in various  contexts is that  of preliminary rulings  by the  Court 
of  Human  Rights  on the  interpretation and  application of the  Convention. 
I  would not  attempt  here  to  go  into this at  any depth.  There  are  a 
number  of questions that  the  idea poses.  For  example,  would the  ruling 
be  declaratory as it were  of the  meaning  and purpose  of the  Convention; 
would it be  in the nature  perhaps  of an  advisory opinion?  If so,  how 
far  can that  be  arrived at  without  some  consideration of the  facts  of 
the  particular case?  I  know  the  courts  of  some  countries  are  very 
reluctant  to make  declaratory  judgments.  We  know  that  the  Second 
Protocol  on  advisory opinions  by the  Court  of  Human  Rights  is perhaps 
too narrowly drafted to be  effective.  I  have  not  been able,  myself, - 88  -
to devise  a  question that  could be  put  under the Protocol,  but that 
may  be  the base  of further  developments. 
Other  questions  of course  are  whether the ruling is advisory 
or whether it is binding in law as  far as  the  issues go,  and who 
could ask for the ruling?  The  national  courts,  the  Commission  or 
the  European  Court  of Justice itself? 
As  far as national  courts go  there is the  familiar  analogy of 
Article 177  and Judge  S~rensen has  raised the  question whether there 
might  be  some  overlap between that  and the  possible application to 
the  Commission.  There  is the  further point,  which  has  been discussed 
in the  Commission  very slightly but  has not  required in fact  any 
decision,  is whether  the  judgments  of the  European  Court  of Justice 
are  a  domestic remedy under Article  26  of the  Convention?  This raises 
the very interesting question of whether  the  European Court  of Justice 
is an international  court  or  a  transnational  court  or in some  ways  a 
domestic  court?  And  I  think we  may  have  at  some  time,  in the 
Commission  at least,  to  consider that  question. 
Mr President,  I  have  tried to offer somE  points  which,  I  think, 
can  I  hope  be  discussed and  I  thank you  once  more  for allowing me  to 
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